Human Capital and Labor Informality in developing countries:

A life-cycle approach (Job Market Paper)*

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November 26, 2013

Latest version at https://sites.google.com/site/italolopezg/research

Abstract

Labor informality accounts for nearly 40% of the labor force in Latin America. While a more traditional view sees this phenomenon as a consequence of barriers to mobility resulting from poorly designed labor regulations, recent work provides evidence that individuals choose informal jobs based on their comparative advantage. In this paper, I develop a dynamic life-cycle model estimated with rich Chilean longitudinal data, in which individuals jointly decide on their schooling and labor participation, to investigate the extent to which comparative advantage drives participation in informal labor markets. Labor markets in Chile have been documented as being fairly competitive, and provide a unique setting to test for the comparative advantage approach to informality. This way, I explore three potential mechanisms: First, the importance that individuals assign to wages relative to their valuation of non-wage sector attributes; Second, whether individuals accumulate sector-specific human capital with heterogeneous returns; and Third, the importance of the labor market expectations driving labor and schooling choices. Heterogeneous returns are included by modeling unobserved heterogeneity that determine both schooling and sector-specific productivity. Model estimates suggest that comparative advantage is an important source of selection into informal jobs. I find evidence that human capital differs across sectors. In particular, High School returns are larger in the formal sector; there is a wage premium to College in the informal sector; and unlike informal experience, formal experience is positively rewarded in formal and informal jobs. In addition, more educated individuals assign more importance to non-wage sector attributes, particularly in the formal sector, while less educated individuals value higher wage returns, particularly in the informal sector.

Using the model to study the effects of recently implemented policies, I find that a wage subsidy to formal youth employment would increase high school participation and would persistently reduce informality over the life-cycle, which serves to prove the importance of labor market expectations. Finally, I also find some evidence of barriers to mobility to the formal sector.

*I am deeply thankful to Costas Meghir and Orazio Attanasio, my thesis supervisors, for their valuable guidance and help. I also thank Pedro Carneiro, Emanuela Galasso and Jeremy Lise for their support and helpful discussions.

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1 Introduction

The phenomenon of informal labor markets in developing economies has been one of the main concerns for economists and policy-makers during the past decade. According to Gasparini and Tornaroli (2007), nearly 40% of the labor force in Latin America is informal, ranging from lower bounds of 25% in the cases of Chile and Uruguay, to upper bounds of 60% in the cases of Peru and Colombia. The informal sector often comprises small-scale, self-financed and unskilled labor intensive activities, and workers in this sector tend to be younger and less educated (Maloney (1999)). Given that informal activities are fairly widespread across different industries and economic activities, Amaral and Quintin (2006) and Moscoso Boedo and D Erasmo (2013) argue that we can characterize the formal and the informal sectors as having two different production functions. Formal firms not only tend to be larger, but also have larger capital/ labor ratios, higher levels of technology, and demand labor that is more skilled. As a consequence, the formal sector tends to operate at larger ranges of productivity, while wages are also larger (Meghir, Narita, and Robin (2012)). Furthermore, Levy (2010) argues that, in order to avoid costly labor regulations and contributions, informal firms distort their size and tend to operate with suboptimal combinations of capital and labor given the technology available. Since labor and capital are misallocated, observationally similar workers can be considered as less productive in the informal sector. They are also paid lower wages and are not covered by social security. Considering this, there has been a wide consensus that informal labor is composed of workers who, voluntarily or not, do not contribute to the social security system.

Most of the debate on the phenomenon of labor informality has focused on understanding whether individuals choose to work informally based on their comparative advantage, or on the contrary, whether this is the result of exclusion driven by segmented labor markets that impose barriers to mobility, in particular towards the formal sector. If markets are competitive, then workers optimally decide on their sector of employment based on their skills and preferences for job attributes like autonomy, independence, or the possibility of avoiding costly taxes and contributions.

In light of this, policies changing labor market incentives in favor of one particular sector would influence the expected rewards of forward-looking individuals and encourage them to accumulate human capital in the sector with the largest expected benefits. Moreover, educational policies facilitating schooling participation could potentially change the incentives for informal labor participation depending on how schooling is rewarded across sectors. In contrast, if barriers to mobility created by poorly designed labor policies prevent workers from choosing jobs according to their skills and preferences there will be little role for policies tackling informality from a human capital accumulation perspective. The evidence from Latin American countries seems rather mixed. While authors like Pagés and Stampini (2007) provide some evidence of labor market segmentation, authors like Perry (2007), Levy (2010), Magnac (1991) and Bosch, Goni, and Maloney (2007) claim that
workers self-select into informal jobs based on their comparative advantage.

In this paper, I contribute to this debate by studying, from a dynamic perspective, the extent to which comparative advantage drives participation in informal labor markets. I develop a life-cycle model in which individuals that are heterogeneous in their skills and preferences make decisions about both their schooling and labor market participation into either formal and informal jobs, or non-employment. For this purpose, I explore several mechanisms. First, some authors have noted that in addition to their wages, people might also value some non-wage attributes of a job, which sometimes even compensate them for potentially lower pay (Maloney (2004)). For example, workers who decide to be informal may attach more value to flexibility, autonomy, or the possibility of avoiding paying taxes and contributions, from which they derive little value; while workers in the formal sector may attach more value to the fringe benefits associated with a formal contract. Considering this, I attempt to disentangle the relative importance of wage returns from preferences for sector amenities driving selection into formal and informal jobs, and study whether these valuations vary across education. Second, if the formal and informal sectors can be defined as having different production functions, then individuals will accumulate sector-specific human capital and the returns to different types of skills should differ across sectors. Moreover, people might have certain unobserved skills that are more productive in one particular sector, making these returns heterogeneous. Consequently, I study whether individuals accumulate different human capital across sectors by breaking down wage differences into sector-specific returns to abilities, schooling, and accumulated experience in several sectors. Third, there is little knowledge of the importance of labor market expectations and dynamics driving both school attendance and labor market participation in the context of an economy with both a formal and an informal sector. That is, if individuals can foresee the existence of two large sectors with potentially different wage returns and job amenities, the assessment of the importance of labor market expectations becomes relevant for the design of policies in the long-term. Finally, I use the model to further study the existence of barriers to mobility across sectors that cannot be explained by skills and preferences, relying on the estimation of transition costs.

Based on these mechanisms, my work contributes to the literature in four different ways. First, I develop a life-cycle structural model building on a Roy model extended to endogenous schooling (Willis and Rosen (1979)), and also extended to compensating wage differentials (Killingsworth (1987)), which I estimate with rich Chilean longitudinal data from a nationally representative sample of households over the period 1980-2009. This approach has important advantages. First of all, it emphasizes dynamics in the decision-making process. Workers may acquire more or less schooling and might change their choice of sector, weighting up current and expected returns from labor markets in dual economies. Additionally, a structural model can shed light on which components of comparative advantage matter more for choices (e.g. abilities, schooling, sector experience, personal preferences). Finally, a structural estimation can also shed light on the presence of barriers to mobility that cannot be explained by skills and preferences by estimating the transition costs.
of moving across sectors. Addressing these issues using the more traditional approaches previously employed in the literature has several limitations. Some authors have attempted to test for the comparative advantage approach by using wage differentials (Maloney (1999), Yamada (1996)). However, as Magnac (1991) notes, wage differentials might fail to test for selection based on comparative advantage, if workers choose informal jobs based on utility differences associated with non-wage sector attributes. In contrast, a structural approach allows the disentanglement of preferences for non-wage attributes from the observed patterns of choices and wages. Other authors have proposed the study of mobility across sectors as a more reliable test (Bosch, Goni, and Maloney (2007), Bosch and Maloney (2007)). However, as Pagés and Stampini (2007) argue, in an environment where workers are continuously facing idiosyncratic and industry-specific shocks that require job reallocation, it is still possible to observe mobility in non-competitive labor markets. On the contrary, a structural model enables the simulation of choices within an economy in which workers who have heterogeneous skills and preferences continuously face preference and productivity shocks.

Second, to my knowledge there is little evidence in the literature linking participation in informal labor markets with schooling decisions. Arbex, Galvao, and Gomes (2010) study selection into education and informal jobs in Brazil and find evidence that education is endogenous. However, their approach does not account for dynamics and sector-specific skill accumulation, while these elements are an important source of selection in my findings. In this regard, Pagés and Stampini (2007) study the extent to which education is a passport to accessing better jobs, by analyzing labor market segmentation in three Latin American countries, employing wage differentials and mobility across sectors using longitudinal data. They find evidence of a formal wage premium when these jobs are compared to informal salaried jobs, but no evidence of a formal wage premium when they are compared to self-employment. Nevertheless, in their approach schooling is considered exogenous.

Third, different authors have stressed the importance of heterogeneity when testing for comparative advantage and labor informality. Even when considering the average wage offer to be larger in the formal sector, sector-specific comparative advantage may be driven by heterogeneous skills and tastes; hence for some workers, it is more profitable to be informal. For instance, unobserved skills such as entrepreneurial ability may drive selection into informal jobs associated with self-employment activities. Therefore, I explicitly incorporate permanent unobserved heterogeneity in the form of initial endowments that can be rewarded differently in each sector, with the immediate consequence that wage returns across sectors are heterogeneous. These initial endowments, modeled with discrete and finite unobserved types (Heckman and Singer (1984)), jointly determine school attendance and sector-specific productivity.

Finally, I use the model to test for the importance of dynamics and analyze the part which labor market and educational monetary incentives play in schooling attendance and the choice to be formal or informal. In the first exercise, I analyze the incentives for sector-specific human capital accumulation and labor choices
as a result of the implementation of a 20% wage subsidy to formal youth employment, targeted at workers between 19 and 26 years old, the age group with the highest informality rates. Another analysis relates to the incentives provided by a large increase in college subsidies in the context of a tertiary education system characterized by high tuition fees. The analysis of these two exogenous changes in the structure of incentives is closely related to recently implemented ongoing policies in Chile.

Some estimation results related to the proposed mechanisms are important to highlight. First, I find that both wage returns and non-wage job attributes drive choices, but their relative importance varies across education levels. Individuals not completing secondary education tend to value wages more than individuals at higher education levels, who tend to assign a larger relative valuation to non-wage attributes of jobs. Within education groups, individuals with High School degree or College level education, assign a similar valuation to wages, but tend to value relatively more the associated fringe benefits offered by formal jobs. On the contrary, individuals with Less than High School degree level education attach a similar value to non-wage attributes across formal and informal jobs, but they assign a larger valuation to wage returns in the informal sector.

Second, I find that individuals accumulate different types of human capital across formal and informal jobs, and the returns to these skills are heterogeneous. For example, I find a positive association between abilities driving selection into schooling and productivity in the formal sector. In addition, returns to finish High School are larger in the formal sector, while there is a wage premium for College in the informal sector. This finding is consistent with the findings of Arbex, Galvao, and Gomes (2010), who argue that in order to explain the presence of highly educated individuals in the informal sector, the monetary compensation for the loss of fringe benefits associated with a formal contract has to be large. Furthermore, the estimated returns to formal experience are positive in both the formal and informal sectors, while informal experience has positive returns only in informal activities for individuals with a very low level of education, and its returns are negative in the formal sector.

Third, by analyzing changes in schooling and labor supply from counterfactual policy simulations, I find that a 20% revenue neutral wage subsidy to formal youth employment targeted at workers between the ages of 19 and 26 years, who hold a formal contract, would increase High School completion rates by 1.0% and would slightly decrease college participation. The subsidy would decrease informality rates on average by 2% for the targeted age groups, but the effects would remain over the life-cycle, starting to decrease only by age 35. As individuals react significantly to monetary incentives, and changes in labor supply are persistent, I conclude that labor market expectations matter for choices. Finally, the estimated transition costs from the informal to the formal sector are substantially larger than in the opposite direction, while re-entry costs from non-labor participation into the formal sector are also larger. Given that, in general, workers prefer to work in formal activities but transitions to this sector are more costly, I interpret these findings as evidence of the existence of some barriers to entry to the formal sector.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a short literature review on the theoretical background of informality and its link to the Chilean context; Section 3 describes the surveys and provides the main data descriptives; Section 4 describes the modeling framework; Section 5 discusses the estimation and the identification strategy; Section 6 discusses the estimation results and policy simulations; and Section 7 is the conclusion.

2 Background and Related Literature

The traditional perspective on why informal labor markets dates from Harris and Todaro (1970) and the ILO (1972). In this approach, informality is the result of barriers to entry to the formal sector caused by stringent labor regulations like binding minimum wages and segmented labor markets. Magnac (1991) defines labor market segmentation as a characteristic of dual labor markets in which the rewards in different economic sectors may differ for workers with equal potential productivity and the entry of workers to the formal sector is rationed. One implication of this view is that identical workers will achieve larger benefits in the formal sector, and that they are paid larger-than-equilibrium wages. A second implication is that workers never switch voluntarily from a formal to an informal job.

Recent work has questioned the traditional view of informal work as the disadvantaged sector (Bosch, Goni, and Maloney (2007), Bosch and Maloney (2007), Maloney (1999)). In this literature, workers choose their sector of employment based on vocational choices and their comparative advantage to work in a more entrepreneurial sector. Thus, informality status may be driven by choice rather than exclusion (Perry (2007)). Under this view, labor markets are competitive, there are no barriers to mobility across sectors, and the formal and the informal sectors are symmetrical, equally desirable, and competitive with different production functions. Levy (2010) proposes a more nuanced view of the comparative advantage approach, recognizing that labor markets are not necessarily competitive and that costly labor regulations cause some distortions. He argues that the informal sector is less productive than the formal sector because there is a misallocation of capital and labor across the sectors produced by badly designed social policies, such as social protection programs for the poor, which induce a higher than optimal rate of firms and workers operating informally. On the one hand, firms optimize given the constraints imposed by labor regulations, so in order to operate formally they pay higher labor costs, are more productive and have better technology. Complementarity of skills and technology means that in equilibrium formal firms demand more skilled workers. On the other hand, workers choose employment optimally but this is constrained by their skills and their tastes for non-wage sector attributes like autonomy, flexibility, or the possibility of evading taxes and social security contributions (Maloney (2004)).


\[2\]Moscone Boedo and D Erasmo (2013) develop a macroeconomic model of TFP with capital imperfections calibrated with
Most of the evidence in Latin American countries supports the comparative advantage approach to informality. Analyzing wage differentials, Maloney (1999) for Mexico and Yamada (1996) for Peru find little evidence that formal workers have higher earnings than the self-employed. Moreover, they find evidence of positive selection into micro-entrepreneurial activities. But as Magnac (1991) notes, testing for competitive labor markets by comparing observed or potential wages is incorrect because of selection bias; workers might have specific skills in each sector. Instead, he tests for segmentation using data for females in Colombia by incorporating entry costs into a standard Roy Model, and finds that the assumption of competitive labor markets cannot be rejected. One limitation of his approach is that if utility depends on the non-wage-related attributes of jobs in each sector, segmentation is no longer testable using a Roy model but should be tested using a compensating wage differentials model. Pagés and Madrigal (2008) use job satisfaction data from three low-income countries to assess the extent to which different types of informal jobs provide compensating amenities. They find a large degree of heterogeneity of job valuation within informal jobs and across formal and informal jobs. For example, within typically classified informal jobs, self-employment activities are the most preferred, while being an informal salaried worker in a small firm is the least preferred.

The limitations of the analysis of wage differentials have led some authors to test for the comparative advantage approach by studying mobility across sectors. Bosch, Goni, and Maloney (2007), Bosch and Maloney (2007) and Maloney (1999) find substantive evidence of mobility across the formal and the informal sectors, with higher rates among the less-skilled. Bosch, Goni, and Maloney (2007) argue that a substantial amount of the informal work corresponds to voluntary entry, which is particularly true for the self-employed. Nonetheless, they also recognize that informal salaried work may correspond closely to the standard queuing view, especially for younger workers. Pagés and Stampini (2007) obtain similar results by developing a benchmark mobility indicator measuring the degree of mobility that would occur in a world in which all states are equally preferred and compare the actual rates of mobility to that indicator to test for segmentation. They find evidence of labor market segmentation when comparing the formal salaried to the informal salaried jobs, whereas self-employment participation is driven by comparative advantage.

Finally, some authors have provided evidence that supports the comparative advantage approach to informality by investigating the returns to schooling across sectors. Amaral and Quintin (2006) and Paula and Scheinkman (2007) find heterogeneous returns to college education in the informal sector in Argentina and Brazil. Arbex, Galvao, and Gomes (2010) note that in order to work informally, skilled workers have to give up some fringe benefits associated with a formal contract. Therefore, returns to college education should be positive or at least high enough to offset the lack of benefits. Developing a two-period theoretical framework with endogenous schooling and heterogeneous returns, tested empirically by using IV quantile regressions with data from developing countries, and find that countries with a low degree of debt enforcement and high costs of formalization are characterized by low allocative efficiency and a larger informal sector, lower productivity, and lower stocks of skilled workers. Paula and Scheinkman (2007) develop and test an equilibrium in which they show that managers in formal firms have higher levels of ability and choose a higher capital-labor ratio than informal entrepreneurs.
Brazilian data, they find an education premium in the informal sector, which varies along the conditional distribution of earnings. Meghir, Narita, and Robin (2012) develop an equilibrium search model with a formal sector and an informal sector in Brazilian labor markets, and find that on average wages in the formal sector are higher than in the informal sector. However, informal workers are paid more than formal workers in firms operating at the same level of productivity.

Some important implications can be extracted from the available evidence for modeling considerations. First, to overcome the limitations of the analysis of wage differentials, I propose a structural estimation that considers self-selection into informal jobs and self-employment based on both wage differentials and non-wage sector amenities, which might be valued differently for workers at different education levels. Second, I explicitly model transition costs in order to capture persistency in choices found in the data, and to test for the existence of additional sources of barriers to mobility which cannot be explained by skills and tastes. And finally, the incorporation of heterogeneous returns is a key factor to capture all the different dimensions of comparative advantage that have been previously discussed in the literature.

3 Data and institutional framework

Institutional framework

I consider the informal sector as being composed of firms that are not registered with the authority, not paying taxes, and not either paying social security contributions or coming under the labor laws; and by all full-time (more than 40 hours a week) salaried and self-employed workers reporting that they are not covered by social security contributions.

The evidence of labor market segmentation in Chile is rather scarce. Contreras, Mello, and Puentes (2008) argue that Chile’s tax system is not particularly burdensome, and with regard to labor regulations, the Chilean dictatorship during the 1980s strongly deregulated the labor markets, decreasing severance pay, dismissal costs and minimum wages, and prohibiting union activity. A reform in 1980 intended to link contributions with benefits transformed the pay-as-you-go social security system into a full capitalization system, including pensions and health insurance, making Chile the least regulated labor-market in Latin America. Heckman and Pagés (2003) argue that the incentives for informality from social protection programs for the poor are very small in Chile, compared to bigger economies like Mexico, Brazil or Argentina.

Further characteristics make the Chilean labor market attractive for the study of labor informality using a comparative advantage approach. First, social security contributions are voluntary for the self-employed. As a consequence, the large majority of self-employed workers are informal, particularly those with lower levels of education. Second, social security contributions and taxes are compulsory for employees, and employers are responsible for deducting them automatically from their salaries. However, the labor protection rules can
be easily avoided by small firms, and as a result roughly half of the informal workers are salaried employees (the other half are self-employed). Finally, Contreras, Mello, and Puentes (2008) provide some evidence that the more educated tend to hold more formal jobs, and that participation is the result of self-selection based on skills rather than the effects of barriers to mobility, which is tested in the context of a wage differentials approach.

With regard to educational institutions, two aspects are important to highlight. First, due to massive liberalization of the education market in 1981, private provision of schooling at both high school and college levels is very high. At tertiary level, average tuition fees are very high and show high variability (US$2,700 a year compared to an annual minimum wage of US$ 3,800). As monetary costs for schooling are large and might greatly influence schooling decisions, I incorporate the variability in the data on tuition fees in order to identify college choices in the modeling framework. Tuition fees at secondary level are rather low. In the Chilean school system three schooling systems co-exist: free public schools (50%), private subsidized schools (43%) and private non-subsidized schools (7%). The amount of subsidies received by the second group are as large as the cost per student that the state spends on public schools, so the variability in the tuition fees paid by the families in the sample is rather low to be used as a source of identification of high school choices. For this reason, I do not include monetary costs in the preferences for high school participation.

The surveys

The “Encuesta de Protección Social” (Social Protection Survey) is a longitudinal survey containing four waves: 2002, 2004, 2006 and 2009. It covers a nationally representative sample of 14,945 individuals who are followed across the four waves with very low attrition rates. In the first wave, individuals are asked to report their family background, all of their educational history, and all of their labor activities from 1980 onwards, which include the type of job performed, hours of work, whether they were paying social security contributions in that job, and their labor status (whether they worked in a firm or were self-employed). Since female labor participation is rather low (44%), the model is estimated for males to avoid fertility decisions.

Direct costs to schooling like tuition fees, are not observed in the sample. In order to simulate college choices I use a second data source, the CASEN survey, to construct a tuition fee index by municipality and year, which is incorporated as monetary costs into the model. This survey is nationally representative, and among many other socio-demographic variables, households report the fees they were entitled to pay, and any amount of subsidy provided by the state, so the total monetary costs can be retrieved. The data is available for the years 2000, 2003, 2006 and 2009, coinciding with the panel of wages and choices used for estimation. In order to control for potential sources of endogeneity of concurrent trends of tuition fees and labor outcomes, the data is time and municipality detrended before being used for the simulations.
Finally, an important drawback of the panel survey is that information on wages is only available from 2001 onwards. As high school and college participation sharply increased during the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s in Chile, returns to schooling are not expected to be the same across cohorts. To overcome this data limitation, I reconstruct the wage profiles by schooling for the oldest cohorts at younger ages (for which I do not observe wages), by assuming that cohort effects by schooling are constant across ages. Furthermore, the model is estimated using the data for individuals who started making choices after 1980, as it’s not possible to track sector experience in each sector for those who began their labor market participation earlier.

In total, the panel of males consists of 4,493 individuals, with 117,003 individual-year observations.

Data descriptives

Some data descriptives are worth showing to shed light on the main correlations and sources of dynamics.

Figure 1.a describes informality rates for the males by age group over the period of the study. Informal work is more common among the youth and the elderly, trends which remain after controlling for cohort fixed effects. The u-shape of informality rates is explained by a larger amount of informal salaried work among the youth, and increasing participation in self-employment when workers become older. Consistent with evidence from other Latin American countries, Figure 1.b also shows that informal labor participation decreases for more educated workers, a trend which remains relatively stable over the life-cycle. These trends are similar for women. Remarkably, the strongest differences in informality arise between high school degrees and lower than high school levels. Schooling differentials remain when the informality rates are analyzed separately for the self-employed and salaried employees.

![Informality Rates](image)

![Informality Rates by Education](image)

Figure 1: a) Overall Informality Rates; b) Informality rates by schooling

3(Figure A.1 Appendix A)  
4(Figure A.2 Appendix A)  
5(Figure A.3 Appendix A)
Figure 2 compares net wages (after tax and social contributions) in a two-sector economy. Consistent with evidence from other Latin American countries, formal wages are always larger than their informal counterparts for all schooling levels. However, the formal wage premium is neither constant over the life-cycle nor across schooling levels. For high school dropouts, the average wage premium is relatively stable for all age groups, whereas for individuals with high school degrees and college level education the wage premium widens. This feature, and the fact that wage profiles have different slopes across education groups, suggest different underlying dynamics of sector-specific human capital accumulation, justifying the choice of a comparative advantage approach as the modeling framework.

As discussed above, Maloney (1999) and Pagés and Madrigal (2008) indicate that there is evidence of heterogeneity within informal jobs. The self-employed tend to report higher levels of job satisfaction compared to the informal salaried, and they are likely to self-select into these jobs while the informal salaried seem to face some barriers to mobility. Figure 3 describes participation patterns in Chilean labor markets. While informality among the salaried decreases over the life-cycle, self-employment increases. As roughly 85% of the self-employed do not contribute to the pension system, and therefore are informal, the patterns of informality described in Figure 1.a are the result of composition effects, which would be important to the interpretation of my results. Youth informal workers are mainly salaried workers employed in small firms, whereas the high number of informal workers among the elderly reflects a larger proportion of self-employed. Indeed, Perry (2007) argue that some workers with entrepreneurial abilities start their working lives as salaried employees where they accumulate capital and experience to run their own businesses later in life. These patterns are consistent with previous evidence that informal salaried work is less desirable than self-employment.

\[\text{Note that wage profiles with different slopes across education groups require the inclusion of interactions between education and sector experience in the estimation of standard Mincerian wage equations.}\]
Table 1 indicates that the probability of having some level of experience as informal or as a self-employed in the sample is rather large, so there is mobility across sectors. The fraction of workers with experience as both formal and informal, and as self-employed workers, decreases with schooling, which is consistent with the data for other Latin American countries reported by Perry (2007). One the one hand, 69% of high school dropouts have labor experience both in the formal and informal sectors, while these rates are lower for individuals with high school degree and college level (52% and 40%). On the other hand, 70% of high school dropouts have experience as salaried employees and of being self-employed, while these rates also decrease for individuals with high school degree and college level (32% and 13%).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Schooling Level</th>
<th>Experience as formal and informal</th>
<th>Experience as self-employed and salaried employee</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LHS</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Fraction of workers with experience as formal/informal, and self-employed/salaried employees
However, once workers enter a sector, the probability of switching to another sector is rather low, or persistency in choices is large. For example, among the formal salaried workers, the probability of remaining in the same sector is more than 90%. In contrast, transition rates to the formal salaried state conditional on being informal salaried are larger, and they tend to increase for more educated workers (9.5% for LHS, 16.6% for HS and 15.7% for College). This seems to be in line with the idea that informal salaried work responds to the traditional view of barriers to entry to formal jobs. Conditional on being self-employed, the probability of moving to the formal salaried sector is 5% on average (4.2% for LHS, 5.9% for HS and 5.4% for College), roughly twice the probability of moving to self-employment from the formal salaried state. Finally, note that the degree of persistency in the self-employment state is almost as large as in the formal salaried state, and much larger than persistency in informal salaried jobs. This is consistent with the notion that self-employment is a choice (Bosch, Goni, and Maloney (2007).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Less than High School</th>
<th>High School Degree</th>
<th>College</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>90.1% 1.8% 2.5% 3.7%</td>
<td>90.7% 1.1% 2.1% 2.3%</td>
<td>90.8% 0.6% 1.7% 2.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>9.5% 80.2% 3.7% 5.6%</td>
<td>16.6% 67.6% 4.9% 5.0%</td>
<td>15.7% 61.0% 3.9% 10.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S</td>
<td>4.2% 1.5% 89.6% 3.2%</td>
<td>5.9% 1.2% 84.9% 2.1%</td>
<td>5.4% 1.2% 83.5% 2.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U</td>
<td>12.1% 4.1% 4.3% 77.4%</td>
<td>20.5% 4.3% 3.8% 65.1%</td>
<td>18.6% 3.7% 3.9% 67.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Persistency

4 The Model

The theoretical framework is an extended Roy Model allowing for endogenous schooling choices (Willis and Rosen (1979)) and for compensating wage differentials (Killingsworth (1987)). I build on the literature on career paths and dynamic discrete choice models with unobserved heterogeneity proposed by Keane and Wolpin (1997) and Adda, Dustmann, Meghir, and Robin (2013). Two important assumptions are considered for modeling purposes. The first assumption is a partial equilibrium environment, so I analyze workers’ decisions given the incentives provided by the current structure of labor markets; therefore the skill rental prices are fixed and known to the individual. Under the presence of GE effects, the skill rental prices can change with the relative supply of workers with different types of skills, and individuals internalize the change in returns in their decisions. Therefore, the analysis of how people react to education and labor market incentives should be taken as middle-term responses.
The second assumption in this particular setup is risk neutrality. The inclusion of risk aversion has a potential effect on labor supply in two cases. First, individuals might choose to be more formal or informal and save for precautionary reasons in response to potentially larger unemployment or income shocks inherent to one particular sector, or in the case of informal work, in response to the uncertainty of not having a pension on retirement. However, it has been reported that in Chile savings are zero or negative for the first four income quantiles7. And second, risk averse workers might react to the incentives provided by the contributory pension account, which are compulsory savings for formal workers. But as Attanasio, Meghir, and Otero (2011) note, these incentives are likely to affect labor supply decisions only for workers who are more than 45 years old, and they report that for males in these age groups the effects are very low (less than 1.7% decrease in formal labor participation). Nonetheless, an interesting extension of the model is the incorporation of risk averse individuals alongside both private and pension savings to analyze how schooling and labor supply would change in response to credit market imperfections.

In this modeling framework, workers then choose schooling and sector participation according to their comparative advantage, but transitions across sectors are costly, which might reflect the presence of labor market rigidities. A worker’s comparative advantage is a complex vector, which includes observed and unobserved skills, and tastes for non-wage job amenities. Unobserved skills are modeled as initial skill endowments by including discrete and finite unobserved types in the fashion of Heckman and Singer (1984). Wage offers are sector-specific and are the realization of a technology of skill production function that embodies the accumulated human capital of an individual valued in a particular sector according to an equilibrium rental price. The model attempts to reproduce the dynamics found in the data by explicitly incorporating labor market expectations as part of the valuation of current choices. In the context of a human capital investment model, this means two things. First, past schooling and labor choices determine the accumulated level of skills, which could be rewarded differently in each sector depending on market prices. And second, individuals don’t know for sure the future benefits of a particular choice in the present, but they know the distribution of shocks, so they can evaluate the future expected rewards for every possible current choice.

It is worth stressing some model mechanisms. First, wage returns are heterogeneous. Therefore, the fact that formal wages are larger on average doesn’t mean that this is true for everyone. Furthermore, conditional on schooling and sector-experience some individuals might earn more in informal salaried jobs or in self-employment if their initial skill endowments are better rewarded in these sectors, which reflects the fact that skill endowments are not necessarily equally productive across sectors. Second, initial skill endowments explicitly relate to schooling choices and productivity across sectors, as skill endowments act as a proxy for the underlying ability of the individual, which might determine self-selection into higher levels of schooling. Third, even if the accumulated human capital of an individual is better rewarded in a particular sector, she might end

---

up choosing another sector for several reasons. For example, she might value the non-wage attributes of the job more, like the level of flexibility or autonomy, or she might face large search or psychological costs to transition to the sector with a larger wage. Finally, these features have important implications for understanding how people would react to incentives. For example, the effects of individual behavior of a decrease in income taxes in the formal sector are reduced if non-monetary incentives are too important or if schooling attainment or the choice of a sector are highly dependent on ability.

The timing of the model is as follows. Individuals make their first choice at age 14. They can achieve three education levels: “Less than High School”, “High School Degree” or “College”. Everyone starts with primary schooling which is completed at \( t = 0 \) (age 14). In the sample 96% of students complete this level. At every subsequent period people decide whether to continue to the next schooling level, start working in formal or informal jobs, or stay out of the labor market in unemployment or home production activities. Denote \( m = \{F, I\} \) one of the three working sector choices, where \( F = \text{formal salaried} \) and \( I = \text{informal salaried} \). The choice of home production, non-participation or unemployment is denoted by \( U \).

4.1 The State Space

Denote the state space \( \Omega \) as the set of variables that define the state-dependency of individual utilities over time. I estimate a life-cycle model so the time dimension \( t \) is the age of the individual. I detrend the data on wages and tuition fees to control for macroeconomic trends, and I take out cohort effects to compute data moments. \( Ed_{it} \) is the schooling level of individual \( i \) at age \( t \). Then \( Ed_{it} = \{LHS, HS, Col\} \) or Less than High School, High School Degree level, and College level. Accordingly, labor experience accumulates by sector.

Finally, I denote the unobserved ability by \( \mu_i \). Higher ability individuals self-select more into schooling, and at the same time, people have different sets of skills that make them more productive in one sector than in another, driving their choices. For example, entrepreneurial ability might drive self-selection into informal jobs or self-employment, while the ability to work in structured work environments might drive self-selection into formal jobs. Both of these are known by the individual and fixed from age 14, or \( t = 0 \). On the other hand, they are unobserved by the econometrician and need to be estimated along with the rest of the parameters. I incorporate permanent unobserved heterogeneity by modeling a discrete number \( k \) of unobserved types (Heckman and Singer (1984)), so that \( \mu_k \) is an indicator variable for type \( k \). The use of a discrete and finite number of types is important to make the dynamic programming problem tractable.

4.2 Flow Utilities

At every period, individuals derive an instantaneous utility from attending school, staying at home or working in an economic sector. The costs of that decision are, in the case of schooling, foregone expected earnings
or rewards from leisure/home production. When choosing the working sector, I also allow for non-monetary rewards coming from sector-specific job attributes.

Denote the vector of available choices at \( t \) by \( \{Ed, m, U\} \). Since everyone at \( t = 0 \) starts with \( Ed_t = LHS \), people can make further schooling choices only for High school degree or College, then \( Ed = \{HS, Col\} \). Denote \( U_{it}^{Ed} \) the instantaneous utility of attending schooling at level \( Ed \). Then,

\[
U_{k,R}^{Ed} = \gamma_{1,k}^{Ed} \mu_k - TC_R^{Ed} - \eta^{Ed}
\]

where \( TC_R^{Ed} \) is the tuition fee index constructed from household data, which varies by schooling level \( Ed \) and municipality \( R \). The index is constructed with detrended costs varying over time and across municipalities in order to control for potential concurrent trends with wages and choices. The factor load \( \gamma_{1,k}^{Ed} \) represents psychic costs or the consumption value of the schooling decision, which may capture both heterogeneous abilities and family background which translates into financial constraints to attending high school or college. The term \( \eta^{Ed} \) is a preference shock to schooling including the non-monetary costs of school attendance not observed in the data.

The utility of working in sector \( m \) is

\[
U_{1,k}^{m} = \gamma_{2,Ed}^{m} W_{tk}^{m} - \gamma_{3,Ed}^{m} + \gamma_{4}^{m} t + \gamma_{5}^{m} t^2
\]

where \( W_{tk}^{m} \) is the gross wage offer the individual type \( k \) observes at age \( t \) in sector \( m \) and \( d_t \) is the choice the individual makes at age \( t \).\(^8\) Several additional terms affect sector preferences: \( \gamma_{2,Ed}^{m} \) is the wage valuation, which emphasizes both the marginal utility of income and the valuation of some sector amenities that are non-separable in the utility function. Additional sources of heterogeneity are included in this parameter by allowing it to vary across different sectors and education levels. \( \gamma_{3,Ed}^{m} \) captures the worker’s valuation of non-wage sector amenities which are separable in the utility function. One can interpret this parameter as fixed costs of working, which are also allowed to vary by education levels. This parameter is relevant to understand by how much individuals compensate wage differentials with non-wage sector attributes. A quadratic function in age is also incorporated to capture the fact that individuals at different ages might have different tastes for insurance and/or labor market participation in one particular sector. The parameter capturing age effects is

\(^8\)In a model with risk neutral individuals and returns from the stock markets similar to the interest rate, the timing does not matter when social security contributions such as pension retirement are taken into account. To the extent that there is full capitalization, as in the Chilean case, I consider gross wages, which in the formal sector already account for the total compensation including social security contributions.
\( \gamma^m \) and \( \gamma^m_5 \).

The utility of unemployment/leisure/home production is

\[
U^U_{t,k} = \gamma^U_{1,k}\mu_k - \eta^U_t
\]

The reward that individual type \( k \) obtains from staying at home depends on unobserved skills captured by \( \gamma^U_{1,k} \), and preference shocks \( \eta^U_t \), which is a random component reflecting uncertainty in the valuation of leisure or home production. For example, pregnancy can increase the valuation of unemployment for women.

Finally, the model also explicitly includes transition costs, which are explained below in the section on value functions. These costs are required to be included in order to match the high levels of persistence found in the data.

### 4.3 The Wage Offer

Every time individuals choose to study they forego earnings from work. Since we have different working sectors, every time individuals choose a sector they also forego earnings in another sector. Wages are a function of the skill production function \( H^m_{t,k} \) and skill rental prices \( r^m_t \). As it was specified above, skill functions vary by sector reflect the existence of different production functions across the formal and the informal sector, which might translate into different marginal productivities of each skill component. The human capital accumulated by workers is a function of their schooling level, their accumulated sector experience in the same sector and across sectors, sector-specific unobserved abilities, and productivity shocks.

\[
W^m_{t,k} = r^m_t H^m_{t,k} = r^m_t f(\text{Ed}, X^F_t, X^I_t, \mu_k, \epsilon^m_t)
\]

Given a functional form for the skill function (exponential in this case), the sector-specific log wage offer can be defined as follows,

\[
\ln W^m_{t,k} = \alpha^m_{0,k}\mu_k + \alpha^m_1 HS + \alpha^m_2 Col + \alpha^m_{3,Ed}\ln(1 + X^F_t) + \alpha^m_{4,Ed}\ln(1 + X^I_t) + \epsilon^m_t
\]

where \( \alpha^m_{0,k} \) represents the rental price for the initial endowment in sector \( m \) for individual type \( k \), and captures selection across choices. \( \alpha^m_1 \) and \( \alpha^m_2 \) capture the average returns to schooling levels. Since the data wage profiles by sector and education show very different slopes, which also vary along the life-cycle, I estimate returns to experience varying by education level, captured by the parameters \( \alpha^m_{3,Ed} \) and \( \alpha^m_{4,Ed} \).

Finally, in order to persistency in wages from unobserved factors, I include persistent productivity shocks whose sector-specific innovations are allowed to be correlated across sectors.
\[ \epsilon_t^m = \rho^m \epsilon_{t-1}^m + \xi_t^m \]

\[ \xi_t^m \sim N(0, \Sigma) \]

4.4 Uncertainty

The source of uncertainty in the model comes from preference and productivity shocks. Preference shocks are modeled following an extreme value type 1 distribution, while innovations in persistent wage shocks are normally distributed. Shocks are important to produce mobility across all choices in \( t \) because they shape expected utilities in each of the alternative choices from \( t + 1 \) to \( T \), affecting rewards from current choices. It is likely that innovations of productivity shocks are correlated across choices; that is why I draw wage shocks from a multivariate normal distribution. Sector-specific autocorrelations and the distribution of innovations are identified by the time series properties of wage data, so these parameters are estimated along the rest of structural parameters.

4.5 Recursive problem

Self-selection into schooling and jobs is based on expected earnings, which depend on current choices. This entails non-separability over time. The model dynamics are as follows: all individuals start at age 14 having finished primary school. This is a fairly safe assumption as 96% of the sample actually did finish primary schooling (in Chile primary school has effectively been compulsory since 1962). Every year they must choose whether to continue studying for an extra year of secondary schooling, dropout and start working or, stay out of the labor force. At age 18 they must decide whether to continue to College level or drop out of education. If they drop out of school before the 4th level of high school then their education level stays at \( Ed_t = LHS \) (Less than High School). If they dropout straight after the 4th level of secondary school then \( Ed_t = HS \) (High School degree), and if they continue studying to College level then \( Ed_t = Col \) (College). The maximum level of schooling is standardized to 5 years of College. If an individual drops out at any schooling level, she cannot go back to school, a fact that is supported by the data.

If an individual decides to switch sector, she pays a fixed cost \( c^{i,j} \) to move from sector \( i \) in \( t - 1 \) to \( j \) in \( t \). The purpose of these costs is to capture high levels of choice persistence in the data, which can be driven by several factors like search costs, skill depreciation or psychological costs of transitions. They might also capture certain labor rigidities that could partially explain mobility rates.

Denote by \( \Omega_t = \{ Ed_t, X^F, X^I, \mu_k, R, \epsilon_t^m \} \) the state space of type \( k \) at age \( t \). Then the value of education at level \( Ed = \{ HS, Col \} \) is

\[
V_{t,k}^{Ed}(\Omega_t) = \nu_{t,k}^{Ed} + \beta E^{max} \left\{ V_{t+1,k}^{Ed}(\Omega_{t+1}), V_{t+1,k}^{m}(\Omega_{t+1}) - c^{Ed,m}, \nu_{t+1,k}^{U}(\Omega_{t+1}) \right\}
\]
By choosing schooling individuals obtain the instantaneous utility $U_{it}^{Ed}$ plus the discounted expected maximum value over the available alternatives at $t+1$: continuing to the following schooling level, working in one of the two sectors $m = \{F,I\}$, or staying out of the labor market. Expectations are taken over the distribution of preference and productivity shocks implied by choices. Notice that $X_{it+1} = X_{it}$ when individuals choose schooling and that they pay a transition cost only when moving to work, but not when moving to unemployment/leisure/home production.

Similarly, the value of working as a formal-employee at $t$ is,

$$V_{t,k}^m(\Omega_t) = U_{t,k}^m + \beta \text{E} \max \left\{ V_{t+1,k}^m(\Omega_{t+1}), V_{t+1,k}^{m'}(\Omega_{t+1}) - c^{m,m'}, V_{t+1,k}^U(\Omega_{t+1}) \right\}$$

where it is clear that the worker cannot go back to school, and if she wants to switch sector, she has to pay a transition cost $c^{m,m'}$. By choosing sector $m$, individuals accumulate another year of experience in that sector, which translates into an increase in the valuation of all choices rewarding labor experience in sector $m$ at age $t+1$. Finally, the value of unemployment/leisure/home production is

$$V_{t,k}^U(\Omega_t) = U_{t,k}^U + \beta \text{E} \max \left\{ V_{t+1,k}^m(\Omega_{t+1}) - c^{U,m}, V_{t+1,k}^{m'}(\Omega_{t+1}) - c^{U,m'}, V_{t+1,k}^U(\Omega_{t+1}) \right\}$$

where the choice of unemployment does not alter the state space for the next period.

### 4.6 Mobility

In the model, mobility across sectors is generated by three sources. First, an individual may switch to another sector if there is a large positive shock in the sector she intends to move to, and the gains in productivity due to this shock and to the returns to skills in the new sector are larger than the mobility costs and the potential losses in the returns to skills if she stays. Second, even if the shocks and transition costs across sectors are exactly the same, the worker might still want to switch if an additional year of experience in the new sector is better rewarded than an additional year of experience in the current sector. Note that experience accumulated in each sector is potentially rewarded in all sectors with different rental prices. Finally, mobility costs across sectors might prevent individuals from switching. For example, if at some point in the life-cycle a low-skilled informal worker faces a negative shock, she might consider switching to a similar formal job as her experience would also be rewarded in the new job. However, this decision might be prevented by unaffordable entry costs, search costs, rationing, or the lack of networks, preventing movement.
5 Model Solution and Estimation

5.1 Solution Method

Dynamic discrete choice models do not have an analytical solution. Within a finite horizon context, the model must be solved numerically using backward recursion methods. At period \( T \), each individual draws random shocks from the multidimensional error vector \((\eta_T, \epsilon_T)\) and chooses the alternative that yields the maximum instantaneous utility evaluated at every possible state space combination of schooling and labor histories. I assume that the terminal value function over the life-cycle is \( V_{T+1} = 0 \). I denote \( d^*_t = \{Ed, m, U\} \) the optimal choice at every period. Then, at period \( T \) individuals solve

\[ d^*_T = \text{argmax}(U^*_T, V^*_T, U^U_T) \]

At period every period \( t \), two steps are required to compute the value functions. First, they need to evaluate expectations over \( t+1 \) computing the \( E_{\text{max}} \) functions, where expectations are taken over \((\eta_{t+1}, \epsilon_{t+1})\), evaluated at every possible choice and state space combination at \( t \).

To solve for the fact that wage shocks in \( t+1 \) depend on the realizations of wage shocks in \( t \), I follow Galindev and Lkhagvasuren (2010) to approximate persistent shocks in more than one dimension with innovations which are potentially correlated across dimensions. They adapt Tauchen’s method (Tauchen (1986)) by using Markov Chain processes, which they prove is an efficient method provided that the autocorrelation parameters are not close to unit root\(^9\). The evaluation of the \( E_{\text{max}} \) function then involves a multidimensional numerical integration as follows,

\[ E_{\text{max}}[V^*_T, V^*_T, V^U_T] = \int_{\eta_t} \left\{ \max[V^*_T, V^*_T, V^U_T/d^*_t, \Omega_{t-1}, \epsilon_{t-1}] f(\eta) d\eta \right\} f(\epsilon_t | \epsilon_{t-1}) d\epsilon \]

Where \( f(\epsilon_t | \epsilon_{t-1}) \) is the transition matrix for the Markov process of wage shocks. This matrix is a function of the autocorrelation parameters \( \rho^m \) and the variance of wage innovations \( \Sigma \). The advantage of modeling preference shocks \( \eta_t \) with an extreme value Type I distribution is that the expected value (\( E_{\text{max}} \)) has a closed form expression so we can decrease the dimensions of numerical integration. Therefore, the evaluation of the \( E_{\text{max}} \) function only involves the numerical integration across the dimensions of wage shocks, which are normally distributed.

Second, I evaluate the instantaneous utilities at \( t-1 \), again for every possible combination of the steady state

\(^9\)The analysis of the time series of the wage residuals show that the autocorrelation parameters in both sectors are close to 0.9
at that period, drawing the error vectors \((\eta_{t-1}, \xi_{t-1})\) and compute the value functions at \(t-1\): \((V_{t-1}^{Ed}, V_{t-1}^{m}, V_{t-1}^{U})\). The optimal choice at \(t - 1\) is then obtained from

\[
d_{t-1}^* = \arg\max (V_{t-1}^{Ed}, V_{t-1}^{m}, V_{t-1}^{U})
\]

The process is then repeated in the same fashion until \(t = 0\), where the outcome is the evaluation of the optimal choice \(d_t^*\) for every combination of the state space \(\Omega_t\) in every period.

### 5.2 Model Identification

Three aspects of model specification are worth discussing in my modeling framework. First, the model does not suffer from an initial condition problem. As Aguirregabiria and Mira (2010) note, in a model with unobserved heterogeneity, if the initial state space varies across individuals in the sample, one needs to fully specify how the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity changes with initial states. Initial endowments in the first period of the model are likely to be correlated with observable states. Therefore, if there is variation in the distribution of initial states in the sample, one would need to use some parametric or non-parametric specification of how individuals made choices in the past conditional on unobservables, and solve it backwards until the state space becomes independent of permanent unobserved heterogeneity. In this particular case, almost everyone in the sample finished primary school (primary schooling has been compulsory in Chile since 1962), and thus everybody started with the same education and experience.

To identify wage returns in different sectors, I exploit a large sample variation of wages by sector, schooling, and sector experience, to estimate counterfactual wage returns. I observe data for individuals from different cohorts, so I also exploit time variation to reconstruct wage and participation moments by age. I control for cohort effects in sector wages to incorporate the potential variation in returns over time as a result of merging data from different cohorts. With regard to the identification of unobserved heterogeneity parameters varying by type, I attempt to identify the whole distribution of wage profiles by matching different percentiles of sector wage distributions by schooling.

In order to identify the preference parameters in non-working activities, Todd and Wolpin (2010) note that one only needs to specify an exclusion restriction in the working alternatives. In this case, observable education, sector experience, and accepted wages are sufficient statistics to identify those parameters. The identification of preference parameters in the working alternatives require further exclusion restrictions in the non-working alternatives. I exploit the variability on tuition costs of schooling across municipalities and years for this purpose. The CASEN survey is a nationally representative household survey which reports the tuition costs actually paid by families at high school and college levels and any amount of subsidies received, for each
of the years 1998, 2000, 2003, 2006 and 2009. I use this data to retrieve the total tuition fees the family would have to pay at each education level, and I construct a tuition cost index by municipality and year at each level of education, which is incorporated as a proxy for the monetary costs in the model simulations. I take out time and municipality dummies from the construct in order to control for concurrent trends with wages and labor supply.

\[ TC_{t,R}^{Ed} = \delta_0^{Ed} + \delta_1^{Ed} \cdot R^{Ed} + \delta_2^{Ed} \cdot t + \nu_{t,R}^{Ed} \]

so the average residual by time is then used to simulate schooling choices

\[ U_{k,R}^{Ed} = \gamma_k^{Ed} \cdot \mu_k - \nu_R^{Ed} - \eta^{Ed} \]

Finally, in order to identify transition costs across sectors, I exploit the variation of mobility rates by schooling that I observe in the data.

5.3 Estimation

I estimate the model by Indirect Inference (Gourieroux, Monfort, and Renault (1993)). Meghir and Rivkin (2010) emphasize the use of simulation methods for structural estimation, as they do not use all of the information and restrictions implied by the model, given the available data, as MLE methods do, thus speeding up the estimation process. The accuracy of the estimated parameters depends only on good specification of the data identifying moments, which is relatively simple in linear models.

The idea of indirect inference is to simulate data with the model at each iteration of the vector of structural parameters \( \theta \)\textsuperscript{10}. The process starts by simulating data from an initial vector of structural parameters \( \theta_0 \), and passing both the actual and simulated data by an auxiliary model, usually a system of linear regressions, to generate a set of data auxiliary parameters \( \beta \), and the analogous set of simulated auxiliary parameters \( \beta(\theta) \).

At each iteration of the structural parameters \( \theta_j \), Indirect Inference optimally finds the estimates of \( \theta_{j+1} \) that minimize the distance between the data and simulated auxiliary parameters, until convergence is achieved.

For example, in the first iteration the set of initial simulated auxiliary estimates is \( \beta_1(\theta_0) \) and the following set of converging parameters \( \theta_i \) is found by minimizing a weighted distance between the simulated and data auxiliary parameters. The objective function at given iteration \( j \) is given by the metric

\[ \text{Min } \theta \left( \beta - \beta_j(\theta) \right)' W (\beta - \beta_j(\theta)) \]

\textsuperscript{10}Simulating moments involves a forward recursive data generation process which uses as inputs the initial guess of the parameter vector \( \theta_0 \), a random draw of the vector of shocks for every individual at every age \( (\eta_{i,t}, \epsilon_{i,t}) \), and the optimal policy function \( d^*_t \). The forward recursion process works as follows: in period \( t = 1 \) the optimal choice is retrieved by evaluating the policy function in \( \Omega_1 \), whereas the simulated counterfactual wages are obtained by evaluating \( W^{m_1}(\theta_0, \epsilon_1, \Omega_1) \). The optimal choice \( d^*_1 \) involves individuals choosing either education, work in sector \( m \) or unemployment in the first period, so the state space is updated accordingly for the next period accumulating either education or sector experience, and \( \Omega_2 \) is evaluated for each simulated individual. This process is repeated until the whole sequence of choices \( d^*_t = [d^*_1, ..., d^*_T] \) and counterfactual wages \( W^{m_{1}} = [W^{m_{1}}, ..., W^{m_{T}}] \) are obtained and used to simulate moments. I simulate data on choices and counterfactual wages for \( N = 10,000 \) individuals in \( T = 52 \) periods.
where \( W = VCV(\beta)^{-1} \) is the optimal weighting matrix obtained from the auxiliary estimates.

A standard selection problem involves the estimation of a set of auxiliary linear regressions including log wage regressions and LPM models for participation both with the actual data and the simulations. Building on this approach, I use the following auxiliary model

\[
\begin{bmatrix}
\ln W_{it} \\
P(d_{it} = J) \\
P(d_{it} = J|d_{it-1} = J') \\
\Delta \ln W_{it} J'
\end{bmatrix} = Z_{it}' \delta + \nu_{it} \sim N(0, \Lambda)
\]

which involves estimating a log wage regression, the probability of participation in sector \( J \), the transition probability from sector \( J' \) to sector \( J \), and the growth of log wages across sectors, on a vector of observable variables \( Z_{it} \) which includes the schooling level, sector experience, age, and tuition costs. Additionally, we must include in the set of moments the time series properties of the log wage regressions by sector, namely the autocorrelation and the VCV matrix of the shocks innovations. The vector of auxiliary parameters \( \beta \) to be matched are the coefficients of the auxiliary regressors (\( \delta \)), and the VCV of the residuals \( \Lambda \).

**Smoothing the Objective Function**

Using Indirect Inference in discrete choice models imposes important challenges. As Magnac, Robin, and Visser (1999) note, in discrete choice environments, objective functions are step functions of the structural parameters, which makes the use of derivative-based methods difficult. Derivative-based methods are generally preferred to local or global search methods because of speed and accuracy considerations. I use the approach presented by Keane and Smith (2003) who propose the use of a smoothing function allowing estimation by gradients.

To correct for the choppiness of the objective function, they propose an alternative system of auxiliary regressions to be used in the simulated data, which consists in proxying \( d_{it}^J \) by a smooth function of the structural parameters obtained from simulated value functions

\[
g^J(\theta) = \frac{\exp (V^J(\theta)/\lambda)}{\sum_j \exp (V^J(\theta)/\lambda)}
\]

where \( g^J(\theta) \) can be interpreted as the asymptotic probability of choosing alternative \( J \), and \( \lambda \) is a calibrated
smoothing parameter. The mirroring system of auxiliary regressions then becomes

\[
\begin{bmatrix}
\sum_{J} g_{jt}^{J} * \ln W_{it}^{J} \\
g_{jt}^{J} \\
g_{jt}^{J,J'} \\
g_{jt}^{J,J'} * \Delta \ln W_{it}^{J,J'}
\end{bmatrix}
= Z_{it}^{j} \delta(\theta) + \nu_{it} \sim N(0, \Lambda)
\]

Note that in the simulated auxiliary system we can observe each of the counter-factual wages. Therefore, the simulated log wages are the expected log-wages across sectors.

**Identifying Moments**

In order to gain identifying power of the unobserved heterogeneity parameters, I add to the set of auxiliary parameters the proportions of people below wage percentiles {1.0, 25, 50, 75 and 90} by education level and sector, and regressions of log wages by sector on education, experience and age (Blundell, Costa-Dias, Meghir, and Shaw (2013)). The set of moments involves 155 auxiliary parameters used to estimate 45 structural parameters.

Table 3 describes the set of matching moments linked to the set of structural parameters I attempt to identify.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structural Parameters</th>
<th>Identifying Moments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Wage returns</td>
<td>Log wage regressions by sector on {Ed, X^{m}, age, TC}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Autocorrelation and variance of innovation of log wage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Shocks</td>
<td>residuals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Sector preferences</td>
<td>Participation regressions on {Ed, X^{m}, age, TC}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Transition Costs</td>
<td>Wage growth across sectors on {Ed, X^{m}, age}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Transition probabilities regressions on {Ed, X^{m}, age}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Type-specific parameters</td>
<td>Quantiles Log wages by sector and schooling</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Set of identifying Moments

Finally, besides the discussion on the model identification, I check empirically whether the set of moments proposed actually identifies the set of structural parameters. I perform Monte Carlo simulations using the model to generate an artificial dataset from an arbitrary set of structural parameters, which for this exercise are the “true” parameters. Once the artificial data is generated, I conduct the estimation procedure starting from an initial guess, 20%, 40% and 100% deviated from the “true” parameter and check for convergence. In Appendix
B I show that the strategy for model identification combined with a choice of a set of identifying moments do a good job in identifying the “true” structural parameters.

6 Results

In what follows I present the estimation results organized in three sections. The first section shows the Goodness of Fit, validating the model performance in the replication of data patterns. In the second section I discuss the structural estimates. I use these results to answer the first two research questions I attempt to address, that is to say, the relative importance of preferences and wage returns for choices, and the extent to which skill functions are different across the formal and the informal sectors. In the third section, I use the model estimates to assess how individuals react to incentives in a dynamic context. By performing two simulation exercises, here I address the third research question of the paper evaluating the effects of labor market expectations on choices. Moreover, as the counterfactual simulations are based on recently implemented policies by the Chilean Government, the predictions are informative about the potential effects of those policies on schooling attendance and the size of the formal sector.

6.1 Goodness of Fit

First I evaluate the model fit. Figures 5, 6 and 7 show the model fit for gross log wages. Overall, simulated wages do a good job in replicating wage profiles by schooling for the estimated sample, even though the fit is better for high school degree and college levels. The sample data is added for reference in dotted lines. In the case of less than high school level, there is a lack of data availability for informal workers younger than 18 years old, which may be the reason why informal wages for young workers are under predicted, while informal wages for older workers are over predicted. A similar situation occurs with informal wages for college level, even though in this case the model simulations seem to fit the general data pattern.
Figure 5: Model fit wages Less than High School level

Figure 6: Model fit wages High School Degree level
Figure 7: Model fit wages College Level

Figure 8 shows the data and simulated informality rates by schooling. Overall, the model seems to do a good job in fitting the general profile of sector participation by schooling, preserving both the rank and life-cycle profiles of data patterns.

Figure 8: Informality Rates a) Model simulations; b) Data

Finally, Figures 9 and 10 report the model fit for unemployment/leisure/home production and schooling participation. Model simulations of school attendance show a good fit to the data. The model predicts that
37.9% of the simulated sample finished secondary schooling, while this is true for 36% in the sample. In the same way, the model predicts that 27.5% attended at least two years of college, while this is true for 28.8% of the sample. With regard to non-labor participation, the model is able to replicate the general patterns by age, but it somehow over-predicts the fraction of individuals who stay out of the labor market when they are older.

Figure 9: Model fit Unemployment/Home Production

Figure 10: Model fit Schooling Participation
6.2 Structural Estimates

Table 4 shows the estimated preference parameters, which shed light about the relative importance of wage returns and preferences for sector amenities, and the estimated transition costs.

First, I assess the relative importance between wage returns and sector preferences by comparing wage valuations and fixed cost of working. Marginal valuation of incomes are statistically larger than fixed cost of work for individuals with Less than High School and High School degree, while they are similar for individuals with College level. Therefore, less educated people seem to be more liquidity-constrained, as their valuation for the cash-in-hand aspects of the job are more important. The trends go in opposite directions looking at fixed costs to work. Individuals at higher levels of education seem to value more the non-monetary aspects of the wage, no matter the sector in which they participate.

Second, the comparisons of these two parameters across sectors within education level brings important considerations. For Less than High School individuals, fixed costs to work are fairly similar across sectors, while they tend to value wage returns in informal activities more. These findings are consistent with previous evidence that low-educated informal workers tend to value the possibility of evading taxes and social security contributions from which they derive little value, and with evidence that this education group not only participates more of informal activities, but mobility rates between formal and informal activities are larger (Maloney (2004), Pagés and Stampini (2007)). Moreover, while marginal valuation of income is similar across sectors for individuals with High School degree and College level, fixed costs of work are consistently larger in the informal sector for these education groups. In summary, more educated workers face net costs in the informal sector, so the participation of these workers in informal activities should be explained by other reasons like returns to skills.

Third, predicted transition costs are larger for transitions towards the formal sector either from informal jobs or from non-participation. As these mobility costs have been estimated taking into account comparative advantage factors, preferences and shocks, I interpret these findings as evidence of the presence of some barriers to mobility to the formal sector.\textsuperscript{11}

\textsuperscript{11}Note that estimated switching costs are very large in all directions. Kennan (2008) argues that when there are few transitions in the data, estimated switching costs are implausibly large, because transitions must be attributed to unobserved payoff shocks. Therefore, he notes that observed switches must be attributed to unobserved payoff shocks and in order to evaluate their magnitude, one should evaluate how large the switching costs are conditional on the switch being made. When shocks are drawn from the type I extreme value distribution, he shows that the average transition costs of moving from sector i to j are the estimated costs net of the difference in payoff shocks,

\[ \text{AVCost}^{ij} = TR^{ij} - E[\eta_j^t - \eta_i^t | d_i^t = 1] \]

As a result, the monetary magnitude of the estimated transition costs is much smaller once they are adjusted by shocks.
Table 4: Estimated Preference parameters Working Sectors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Preference Parameters Working Sectors</th>
<th>Forma</th>
<th>Informa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wage Valuation ($\gamma_{m,Ed}^m$)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LHS</td>
<td>1.31</td>
<td>1.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS</td>
<td>1.21</td>
<td>1.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>0.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fixed Costs ($\gamma_{m,Ed}^m$)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LHS</td>
<td>-0.62</td>
<td>-0.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HS</td>
<td>-0.73</td>
<td>-0.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Col</td>
<td>-0.74</td>
<td>-0.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transition Costs ($c^{ij}$)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formal to</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-0.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informal to</td>
<td>-0.98</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment to</td>
<td>-1.06</td>
<td>-0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linear age effects ($\gamma_{m}^m$)</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quadratic age effects ($\gamma_{m}^m$)</td>
<td>-0.0046</td>
<td>-0.0039</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5 shows the estimated type-specific parameters, which provides heterogeneity in comparative advantage within the model, and allow to relate schooling and labor choices. Consumption value of schooling is the underlying ability driving schooling attainment, while the returns to initial endowments represent how these abilities are rewarded across sectors. Among the unobserved types, type 2 is related to higher levels of ability and accounts for 84% of the sample, as they face a lower consumption value of schooling net cost of effort both at high school and college levels. Moreover, initial endowments have higher wage returns in the formal sector for both types. However, the wage premium in the formal sector is larger for type 2 than for type 1. As type 2 individuals are the high ability types, one can conclude that there is a positive association between ability and the formal wage premium to initial endowments. A natural implication of this finding is that workers with higher levels of ability, the ones who self-select into more schooling, are also the ones who self-select more into formal activities as these abilities are better rewarded in this sector.
Unobserved Heterogeneity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Consumption Value</th>
<th>Structural Parameter</th>
<th>Type 1</th>
<th>Type 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Schooling ($\gamma_{1,k}$)</td>
<td>HS</td>
<td>-1.18 (0.009)</td>
<td>-0.35 (0.029)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Col</td>
<td>-1.28 (0.037)</td>
<td>-0.42 (0.079)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Returns to Initial Endowments ($\alpha_{0,k}$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Formal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.32 (0.001)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.69 (0.001)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Probability Type 1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0.84 (0.002)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5: Estimated Preference parameters Non-working choices

Table 6 shows the estimated returns to schooling and experience across sectors. Returns to high school degree are larger in the formal sector, but I find a wage premium in the informal sector for college level. This result is in line with previous evidence for LAC countries (Amaral and Quintin (2006)). Arbex, Galvao, and Gomes (2010) argue that a wage premium in the informal sector for high-skilled workers has to be the reason why there is persistent participation in informal activities at college level, as these workers must somehow be compensated for giving up larger benefits in the formal sector. This argument is consistent with my finding that more educated workers value relatively more the non-wage attributes of formal jobs compared to informal jobs, but they participate in the informal sector as a consequence of larger returns to schooling. A second part of the explanation relies on composition effects. In my sample, more than 90% of informal workers over 40 years old and with post-secondary education are self-employed. Therefore, it is fair to conclude that the premium is largely attributed to successful entrepreneurial activities.

Second, the estimated returns to sector-experience suggest that formal experience is greatly valued in the formal sector at all education levels, but it is also valued in the informal sector for the less-skilled. In contrast, informal experience is valued in the informal sector only for the low-skilled, and it seems to be detrimental in the formal sector. This is consistent with multiple evidence from LAC countries showing that transitions between informal and formal jobs are larger for the less-skilled (Bosch, Goni, and Maloney (2007)). Finally, the estimated distribution of sector wages shows that productivity shocks are positively correlated across sectors, and that the variance of informal wages is larger, presumably because of less availability of wage data in this sector.
6.3 Studying dynamic incentives to informality and human capital accumulation.

I use the previous estimates to explore how changes in the structure of the labor market or educational incentives would affect school attendance and labor market participation, emphasizing the importance of labor market expectations in decisions.

Wage subsidies to formal youth employment

I first evaluate the incentives provided by a revenue neutral 20% wage subsidy for young workers employed in the formal sector. I carry out this exercise to produce an analogous analysis of a recently implemented mean-tested wage subsidy of 20% of the gross wage started in 2011, with the aim of supporting the incorporation of disadvantaged workers between 19 to 26 years old in formal labor markets. I use the model estimates to report the results for such a subsidy for the overall population, by educational level, and by unobserved types.

Table 7 describes the effects of such a subsidy on schooling participation. Overall, an exogenous increase in monetary incentives to participate in the formal sector increases secondary schooling completion rates by 1.0%, but it slightly decreases the incentives for college participation by 0.5%. In the case of high school graduates, the interpretation is straightforward. Returns to secondary schooling are larger in the formal sector, thus
the subsidy increases the incentives for formal labor participation as a high school graduate. In the case of college attendance, one plausible explanation for this result is that the subsidy provides incentives to dropout of schooling straight after high school completion and start working in formal activities. This is particularly true for type 2, the high ability type, who are likely to succeed anyway in the labor market even without a college degree.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Schooling Participation</th>
<th>HS</th>
<th>Col</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Sample</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>-0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type 1 (low)</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>-0.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type 2 (high)</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>-2.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7: Effects of the subsidy on schooling

Table 8 describes the effects on sector participation. Overall, informality rates decline substantially (2%) for workers within the targeted age group, and due to dynamics, the decrease in informality rates continue until the end of the life-cycle, although at lower levels. Informality decreases the most for the less-skilled (2.7%), who are likely to value the monetary aspects of labor market incentives more. Moreover, type 1 is more responsive to the tax reduction because the ability premium in the formal sector for this group, although positive, is lower than for type 2. Table 9 and Table 10 (Appendix C) simulate the effects of extending the tax reduction to the age of 40. In this scenario, the decrease in informality rates is larger and more permanent for both types.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>LHS</th>
<th>HS</th>
<th>Col</th>
<th>LHS</th>
<th>HS</th>
<th>Col</th>
<th>LHS</th>
<th>HS</th>
<th>Col</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14-17</td>
<td>-2.3%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-2.1%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-4.4%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-22</td>
<td>-3.0%</td>
<td>-2.1%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-2.9%</td>
<td>-1.7%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-4.4%</td>
<td>-1.8%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23-26</td>
<td>-2.3%</td>
<td>-1.7%</td>
<td>-1.2%</td>
<td>-2.3%</td>
<td>-1.4%</td>
<td>-1.7%</td>
<td>-0.6%</td>
<td>-0.7%</td>
<td>-1.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27-30</td>
<td>-1.7%</td>
<td>-1.2%</td>
<td>-0.4%</td>
<td>-1.8%</td>
<td>-0.8%</td>
<td>-0.7%</td>
<td>-1.4%</td>
<td>-0.5%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31-35</td>
<td>-1.1%</td>
<td>-0.5%</td>
<td>-0.4%</td>
<td>-1.2%</td>
<td>-0.3%</td>
<td>-0.7%</td>
<td>-0.2%</td>
<td>-0.4%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36-40</td>
<td>-0.9%</td>
<td>-0.2%</td>
<td>-0.7%</td>
<td>-1.1%</td>
<td>-0.2%</td>
<td>-1.0%</td>
<td>-0.3%</td>
<td>-0.1%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41-45</td>
<td>-0.8%</td>
<td>-0.1%</td>
<td>-0.6%</td>
<td>-0.9%</td>
<td>-0.1%</td>
<td>-0.8%</td>
<td>-0.5%</td>
<td>-0.1%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46-50</td>
<td>-0.4%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>-0.7%</td>
<td>-0.6%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>-1.0%</td>
<td>-0.6%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51-55</td>
<td>-0.3%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>-0.4%</td>
<td>-0.5%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>-0.6%</td>
<td>-0.5%</td>
<td>-0.1%</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;55</td>
<td>-0.3%</td>
<td>-0.1%</td>
<td>-0.2%</td>
<td>-0.5%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>-0.3%</td>
<td>-0.4%</td>
<td>-0.1%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8: Effects of the subsidy on informality
Finally, Table 11 assesses the redistributional effects of the subsidy. If the subsidy was allocated to all workers belonging to the targeted ages and the cost was shared on a per-capita basis, the subsidy would have detrimental effects, increasing earning inequalities. Type 2 would benefit the most from the increase in monetary incentives because this type has the largest ability premium in the formal sector, so they would be formal anyway. In contrast, if the government was able to observe types and could target the subsidy only at Type 1, there would be a positive redistributive effect of such a policy.

In reality, types are not observable. One alternative to be explored is to exploit further the data on the workers’ socio-economic background when they were children. Individuals are required to report whether the family was poor or not poor when they were young, the education of their mother and the education of their father. If one estimates the probability of being certain type conditional on family background, it would be possible to evaluate the redistributive effects of the true means-tested subsidy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expected lifetime earnings at age 14</th>
<th>Overall</th>
<th>Type 1</th>
<th>Type 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Baseline</td>
<td>186,843</td>
<td>148,366</td>
<td>388,847</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard wage subsidy</td>
<td>198,063</td>
<td>157,387</td>
<td>411,615</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross Gain</td>
<td>11,220</td>
<td>9,020</td>
<td>22,768</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net gain</td>
<td>-404</td>
<td>20,973</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard wage subsidy only Type 1</td>
<td>194,420</td>
<td>157,387</td>
<td>388,847</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross Gain</td>
<td>7,577</td>
<td>9,020</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Net gain</td>
<td>2,656</td>
<td>-1,212</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 11: Effects of the subsidy on earnings inequality

**College subsidies**

One of the main interesting results from the previous exercise is the little effect that monetary incentives have on schooling attainment. In order to test closely for the presence of financial constraints that might influence college attendance and the long-term effects in participation on informal labor markets, I analyze how people would react to a monetary subsidy of 40% to finance college education. Such a subsidy would have a small positive impact on college participation, increasing attendance by 1.8%, where the high ability types would concentrate the largest increases (3.3%). Reyes and Urzúa (2013) note that despite the fact that college education is very expensive in Chile, there is little evidence that credit constraints are the main factor driving college participation. In my findings, this statement is strongly supported by the fact that initial endowments
by unobserved types are the main factor driving selection into schooling, suggesting that most educational policies targeted at the post-secondary or even the secondary level, would have limited impacts as the sensitive and critical periods of skill formation actually happen before children enter high school (Cunha and Heckman (2009)).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>College attendance</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Sample</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type 1 (low)</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type 2 (high)</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 12: Effects of a college subsidy

In terms of labor market participation, Table 13 shows the effects of the subsidy on informality rates for workers attending college. Interestingly, the monetary incentives do not have any effect on informality rates on average, but there are differences by ability type. Type 2, the high-ability type, increase their informal labor participation between 0.5% and 0.7% below age 30, in line with the findings that college returns in the informal sector are larger. However, Type 1 workers decrease their participation in informal labor markets by between 0.4% and 0.8% for the same age group. Limited impacts of college subsidies on career progression in different sectors have been also found in the US by Keane and Wolpin (1997). In their findings, they note that initial endowments at age 16 play a key role in determining selection into college and selection into different types of jobs, reducing the impact of exogenous monetary incentives that are allocated long after the most critical periods of skill formation have already finished.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Average</th>
<th>Type 1</th>
<th>Type 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>14-17</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-22</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23-26</td>
<td>-0.1%</td>
<td>-0.4%</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27-30</td>
<td>-0.1%</td>
<td>-0.8%</td>
<td>0.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31-35</td>
<td>-0.1%</td>
<td>-0.5%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;35</td>
<td>-0.1%</td>
<td>-0.3%</td>
<td>0.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 12: Effects of a college subsidy on informality rates

Overall, these two exercises indicate that, while labor market incentives do have important effects on human capital accumulation in the form of accumulated sector-experience and increase the incentives for high school
completion, the monetary incentives at college level have a positive effect on college participation, but they have a limited effect on labor market participation.
7 Concluding Remarks

I contribute to the literature on labor informality in developing countries by studying whether comparative advantage determines participation in informal labor markets. I develop a life-cycle model building on a Roy Model extended to endogenous schooling decisions and also extended to compensating wage differentials, to analyze how individuals with heterogeneous skills and preferences choose schooling and sector participation based on their comparative advantage. The model is estimated by exploiting rich cross-sectional and time- varied Chilean panel data on wages, sector participation and school attendance.

My contribution to the literature also relies on the exploration of the different mechanisms by which comparative advantage might drive choices. First, a structural estimation allows me to disentangle the relative importance of wage returns and preferences for non-wage attributes in driving decisions. More traditional approaches used to test whether comparative advantage drives informal labor participation might have some limitations. For example, the study of wage differentials between the formal and the informal sectors does not account for the fact that individuals might self-select into jobs based on utility differences, which are not captured by wages. In addition, studies based on the analysis of mobility rates may not be able to separately identify whether choices are driven by comparative advantage or if they are a consequence of idiosyncratic or industry-specific shocks.

Second, some authors have emphasized that a key difference between the formal and informal sectors is that they are likely to have different production functions. While formal firms are associated with larger size, higher capital-labor ratios, and higher technology, and demand more skilled labor, informal firms tend to concentrate unskilled labor-intensive economic activities and operate at lower levels of productivity. I test for this assumption in a partial equilibrium approach, by estimating skill functions that may vary across sectors. I show that returns to abilities, schooling and sector-specific experience largely diverge across the formal and informal sectors. Third, I assess the extent to which labor market expectations matter for decision-making. Model simulations show that individuals react significantly to labor market expectations by making different decisions regarding their schooling and participation in informal labor markets when the relative monetary incentives between the formal and informal sectors change exogenously. The effects of these incentives are persistent over the life-cycle, which indicates the strong effects of dynamics through human capital accumulation. Finally, I test for the existence of barriers to mobility by estimating transition costs that cannot be explained by skills, tastes or shocks.

The modeling framework I propose incorporates some innovations. To my knowledge, there is no previous literature that has studied participation in informal labor markets using a life-cycle approach, in which the schooling decision is endogenous. Moreover, the previous literature studying labor informality has largely stressed the importance of heterogeneity in skills and preferences shaping comparative advantage. I explicitly
model unobserved heterogeneity by allowing initial endowments to jointly drive selection into schooling and sector productivity.

Some estimation results are important to highlight. First, the assessment of the relative importance of wage and sector preferences driving choices shows that both factors are important but there is heterogeneity in the relative valuation across education. Less educated individuals attach more value to monetary rewards than non-wage attributes, and the relative valuation of wages for this group is larger in informal activities. These findings are consistent with previous evidence that less educated informal workers tend to value the possibility of evading paying taxes and social security contributions from which they derive little value. Instead, more educated individuals tend to attach more value to the non-wage attributes of jobs relative to wage returns, and these benefits are larger in the formal sector.

Second, the estimated sector-specific technologies of skill accumulation support the hypothesis that the formal and informal sectors have different production functions. I find that workers with higher levels of ability are better rewarded in the formal sector; returns to High School are larger in the formal sector; and, I find a wage premium in the informal sector for post-secondary schooling. The latter result explains why highly skilled individuals are found to participate in informal activities despite the fact that, by so doing, they give up the large non-wage benefits attached to formal contracts. Furthermore, in my sample, more than 90% of the highly skilled informal workers over the age of 40 are self-employed, which suggests that highly educated informal workers are actually people involved in successful entrepreneurial activities.

Third, I use the model estimates to assess the importance of labor market expectations for schooling and labor decisions. I show that a revenue neutral wage subsidy to formal youth employment would decrease informality by 2% for the targeted age groups, but it would also persistently decrease informality rates for older workers not affected by the policy, which is a consequence of the dynamic effects of the incentives through sector-specific human capital accumulation. Furthermore, the subsidy would also increase the incentives to finish High School (1.5%), and slightly decrease the incentives for college attendance. I also find that the incentives provided by a college subsidy of 40% would increase college participation by 1.8%, with high-ability types being the ones who react the most to the incentives (3.3%). On average informality rates would not be affected, but the policy would significantly reduction informality rates for low-ability types.

And fourth, the estimated transition costs from the informal to the formal sector are substantially larger than in the opposite direction, while the re-entry costs from non-labor participation in the formal sector are also larger. Given that, in general, workers prefer to work in formal activities but transitions to this sector are more costly, I interpret these findings as evidence of the existence of some barriers to entry to the formal sector.

Finally, my research agenda incorporates two model changes intended to improve the understanding of the effect of comparative advantage on labor informality. The first improvement relates to the incorporation of
self-employment as a third sector. As explained above, informality rates are larger for the elderly because of a composition effect. While informality for salaried employees decreases over the life-cycle, among the elderly a larger proportion are self-employed. Figure A.4 in the Appendix shows that if all of the self-employed are now considered as another sector, the economy is composed of the salaried formal, the salaried informal and the self-employed, and a clear rank emerges in terms of wage profiles. Remarkably, the formal salaried face higher wage returns than those in the other two sectors, with slopes increasing in schooling. And while, for individuals with less than High School level education, the wage profiles for the informal salaried and self-employed are similar, at higher schooling levels the self-employed become more similar to the formal salaried. This suggests that the informal salaried and the self-employed have different skill accumulation processes, so it may worth modeling separately the three different sectors. The estimation of such a model is currently a work in progress.

The second improvement relates to the relaxation of some model assumptions. As discussed above, risk neutrality is a relatively safe assumption if one is willing to analyze the dynamics for young workers. However, an interesting extension of the model is the incorporation of risk aversion alongside both private and pension savings to analyze how schooling and labor supply will change in response to credit market imperfections. Additionally, in the current modeling framework, I have also assumed that individuals foresee perfectly, the returns to human capital accumulation across sectors. While most of the literature on dynamic models builds on this assumption, recent modeling frameworks like the ones proposed by Altonji, Blom, and Meghir (2012), emphasize the importance of incorporating the more realistic assumption that individuals face uncertainty about their own preferences and the returns to human capital accumulation. I intend to incorporate richer sources of dynamics in wages and in the paths of human capital accumulation by modeling individuals that learn their own preferences and the technology of skill formation by doing.
References


Appendix

A. Data descriptives

Figure A.1 Informality rates controlling by cohort effects.

Figure A.2 Informality rates by schooling females

Figure A.3 Informality rates by schooling
Figure A.4: Wages by education, three sectors: Salaried Formal, Salaried Informal and Self-employed.
B. Reported Montecarlo Simulations Identification Exercise

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Parameters</th>
<th>( \theta_0 )</th>
<th>( \hat{\theta} )</th>
<th>( \frac{\theta_1 - \theta_0}{\theta_0} )</th>
<th>( \frac{\hat{\theta} - \theta_0}{\theta_0} )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Psychic costs to schooling</td>
<td>( \gamma_{1,k=1}^{HS} )</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.200</td>
<td>1.021</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( \gamma_{1,k=1}^{Col} )</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.800</td>
<td>1.022</td>
<td>-20.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( \gamma_{1,k=2}^{HS} )</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.320</td>
<td>1.086</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( \gamma_{1,k=2}^{Col} )</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.720</td>
<td>0.922</td>
<td>-20.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returns to Ability</td>
<td>( \alpha_{0,k=1}^{F} )</td>
<td>8.189</td>
<td>9.827</td>
<td>7.951</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( \alpha_{0,k=1}^{I} )</td>
<td>8.007</td>
<td>6.406</td>
<td>8.089</td>
<td>-20.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( \alpha_{0,k=2}^{F} )</td>
<td>8.089</td>
<td>9.707</td>
<td>8.109</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( \alpha_{0,k=2}^{I} )</td>
<td>8.107</td>
<td>6.486</td>
<td>7.973</td>
<td>-20.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returns to High School</td>
<td>( \alpha_{1}^{F} )</td>
<td>0.326</td>
<td>0.391</td>
<td>0.330</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( \alpha_{1}^{I} )</td>
<td>0.362</td>
<td>0.290</td>
<td>0.354</td>
<td>-20.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returns to College</td>
<td>( \alpha_{2}^{F} )</td>
<td>1.307</td>
<td>1.568</td>
<td>1.294</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( \alpha_{2}^{I} )</td>
<td>1.208</td>
<td>0.966</td>
<td>1.190</td>
<td>-20.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returns to Experience same</td>
<td>( \alpha_{3}^{F} )</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.240</td>
<td>0.203</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sector</td>
<td>( \alpha_{3}^{I} )</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.080</td>
<td>0.102</td>
<td>-20.0%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cross-sector returns to exp.</td>
<td>( \alpha_{4}^{F} )</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
<td>-0.120</td>
<td>-0.1016</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( \alpha_{4}^{I} )</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.080</td>
<td>0.101</td>
<td>-20.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VCV wages</td>
<td>( \sigma_{FI}^{F} )</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.360</td>
<td>0.350</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( \sigma_{FI}^{I} )</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.560</td>
<td>0.689</td>
<td>-20.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tuition Costs Valuation</td>
<td>( \gamma_{2}^{HS} )</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.800</td>
<td>0.978</td>
<td>-20.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( \gamma_{2}^{Col} )</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.200</td>
<td>1.019</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wage Valuation Informal</td>
<td>( \gamma_{2}^{I} )</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.560</td>
<td>0.687</td>
<td>-20.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Montecarlo simulations estimation exercise

C. The effects of extending the tax reduction to formal workers to the age of 40
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>HS</th>
<th>Col</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Sample</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type 1 (low)</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>0.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type 2 (high)</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>-0.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9: Extension of tax reduction to age 40 and schooling

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Extension</th>
<th>Total Sample</th>
<th>Type 1</th>
<th>Type 2</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LHS</td>
<td>HS</td>
<td>Col</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14-17</td>
<td>-2.3%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-22</td>
<td>-3.1%</td>
<td>-3.1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23-26</td>
<td>-3.1%</td>
<td>-3.2%</td>
<td>-2.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27-30</td>
<td>-2.8%</td>
<td>-2.4%</td>
<td>-1.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31-35</td>
<td>-2.6%</td>
<td>-1.7%</td>
<td>-2.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36-40</td>
<td>-1.9%</td>
<td>-1.6%</td>
<td>-1.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41-45</td>
<td>-1.4%</td>
<td>-1.2%</td>
<td>-1.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46-50</td>
<td>-0.8%</td>
<td>-0.7%</td>
<td>-1.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51-55</td>
<td>-0.5%</td>
<td>-0.3%</td>
<td>-1.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;55</td>
<td>-0.4%</td>
<td>-0.3%</td>
<td>-0.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 10: Extension of tax reduction to age 40 and informality