Chapter 5

The Political Context of Turnout

In Chapter 5 we consider the policy choices offered by candidates as influences on voter turnout, and how these choices influence the representativeness of the electorate. We expect that if eligible voters perceive greater differences between the policy positions of presidential candidates, then they will be more likely to vote. We also examine whether or not voters’ levels of alienation from the candidate choices will affect their likelihood of voting. We examine the relative levels of indifference between the candidates of persons from different income quintiles in elections from 1972 through 2008. And using a multivariate model we estimate the impact of levels of indifference and alienation on turnout. We show that voters are responsive to the choices offered to them. And we show that voters in the bottom income quintile have become more indifferent between the candidates in recent elections than are members of the other 4 income quintiles.

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This chapter is part of a manuscript, *Who Votes Now?* covering voter turnout in the United States from 1972 - 2008. The manuscript examines the demographics of turnout over this time, with an emphasis on changing representation and changes in economic inequality, along with the impact of electoral laws on turnout, and the impact of candidate choices offered on turnout. We also compare the policy preferences of voters and non-voters. [This chapter distributed for presentation at Institut d’Analisi Economica, CSIC, Barcelona, and Hebrew University, Jerusalem.]
5.1 Introduction

A fundamental shift in the study of political participation since Wolfinger and Rosenstone’s classic study has been to acknowledge the critical role of political elites in stimulating (or at times, depressing) voter turnout. Rosenstone and Hansen (2003) offered a theoretical interpretation of the role of elites in affecting turnout similar to that of the demographics model of turnout: in some circumstances, political elites reduce or subsidize the costs of participating, which is likely to increase turnout. Their evidence that the activities of party elites, such as contacting voters, and election characteristics, such as competitiveness, account for “more than half” of the decline of voter turnout since 1960 sustains their more fundamental claim: “Explanations of political involvement that have focused exclusively on the personal attributes of individual citizens—their demographic characteristics and political beliefs—have missed at least half the story.” (2003: 213).

Existing research has shown that contextual factors such as electoral competitiveness (Cox & Munger 1989) and unionization (Leighley & Nagler 2007) affect turnout. In this chapter we address a relatively-overlooked aspect of this other half of the story: candidate position-taking in presidential elections. As V.O. Key (1966) famously observed, “Voters are not fools.” But they are constrained by the electoral choices that they are offered. And it would be more foolish to sit out an election where the choices differ than to sit out one in which the choices are not choices, but echoes.

Zipp (1985) first documented the importance of candidates’ relative policy positions as determinants of voter turnout, but little has been done more recently to assess whether the choices that candidates offer voters matter. Consistent with the cost/benefit framework of voter turnout, we argue that individuals will be more likely to vote when offered more distinctive positions between the candidates. We thus supplement our individual-level demographics model with the relative positions of the leading presidential candidates in each
election year from 1972 through 2008 to test whether the choices that elites offer matter to citizens as they decide to vote or not.

We also consider how these choices have changed over time, and whether the nature of the choices is equally important to the turnout decisions of people in different positions of the income distribution. That is, do the policy positions offered by elites have a larger influence on the turnout of poor people than rich people? And thus do the policy positions offered affect the representativeness of the voters?

5.2 On the Costs and Benefits of Voting

Discussions of why elite activities and characteristics such as party competitiveness, union mobilization and contacting increase turnout typically emphasize how such elite characteristics or efforts reduce the costs associated with voting. More generally, most theoretical interpretations likewise focus almost exclusively on the costs rather than the benefits of voting. Demographic characteristics, for example, are most commonly interpreted as subsidizing information costs, while more recent research on electoral reforms focusing on voter registration requirements and election administration frames these legal restrictions as the true costs of voting.

In a review of some of this work, (Aldrich 1993) suggests that one of the fundamental assumptions motivating many rational choice models of voter turnout –that voter turnout is an example of a collective goods problem–approaches being incorrect. Or, at least, he portrays voter turnout as so low-cost and so low-benefit that it likely takes little in the way of reduced costs or enhanced benefits to get voters to the polls.

Aldrich suggests that the reason turnout appears higher in close elections is that strategic politicians invest more heavily in close races, and that citizens respond to these
mobilization efforts.\footnote{see (Jackman 1993) commentary on Aldrich’s essay} Most aggregate-level studies, and many individual-level studies, report significant effects of competitiveness on voter turnout (see, for example, (Cox & Munger 1989, Endersby, Galatas & Rackaway 2002, Leighley & Nagler 1992\textsuperscript{b}, Rosenstone & Hansen 2003)). But as Aldrich suggests, the causal mechanism remains uncertain: do competitive races yield high turnout because voters calculate that they are more likely to be decisive in such contests, or because elites invest more heavily in mobilization activities?

### 5.3 Alienation and Indifference, 1972-2008

Discussions of benefits as integral to the decision to vote are few in part due to the original observation that one’s benefit must be discounted by the probability that one offers the decisive ballot; because this probability is so small, the benefits virtually approach zero (Riker & Ordeshook 1968). Alternatively, several different types of psychological benefits have been identified: feelings of citizen duty, party loyalties, social rewards from voting that would not necessarily depend on the perceived probability of being pivotal. Yet these interpretations are often discounted for they seem to be post-hoc adjustments to the formal model.

Several scholars, however, have considered a different type of benefit in empirical analyses of voter turnout: the choices that are available to voters, as represented by the candidates (see, for example,(Adams, Dow & Merrill 2006, Adams & Merrill 2003, Ashenfelter & Kelley 1975, Plane & Gershtenson 2004, Thurner & Eymann 1997)). Plane and Gershtenson (2004) find that individuals are less likely to vote when they feel indifferent to or alienated from candidates’ ideological positions. Using data from the 1988-1992 Senate elections, they report that alienation has a greater potential effect on citizens’ turnout decisions than indifference, a finding affirmed by Adams, Dow and Merrill (2006).
The intellectual genesis of the spatial models cited above, as well as our analysis, is Zipp’s (1985) empirical analysis of voter turnout in presidential elections from 1968 to 1980. Zipp argues that individuals’ decisions to not vote likely reflect the choices that they are offered as opposed to any particular individual characteristics (i.e., shortcomings) typically used to explain not showing up at the polls. Zipp conceptualized individuals’ distance from candidates in each presidential election as resulting in alienation (i.e., the distance between the individual’s preferred policy position and the closest candidate’s policy position) and indifference (i.e., the difference in distance between the respondent’s preferred policy position and the policy position of each of the candidates).

Estimating cross-sectional models of turnout consisting of demographic characteristics along with measures of issue-specific alienation and indifference, Zipp concludes that both alienation and indifference significantly influence individuals’ decisions to vote. Though which particular issue-based measures of indifference and alienation are significant varies each election year, Zipp concludes that indifference has a slightly larger effect on turnout than alienation.

Following Zipp (1985) we argue that an individual will be more likely to vote when offered policy choices that match more closely the individual’s preferences, and when candidates take more distinctive policy positions. When candidates’ policy positions are not close to those of the individual, then the resulting alienation of the individual results in lower probability of voting; when candidates’ policy positions are equally appealing or unappealing to an individual, the resulting indifference results in lower probability of voting.

In addition to multivariate tests of these hypotheses, we also describe changes over time in levels of alienation and indifference, and examine whether these changes vary consistently across income groups. Our interest in evaluating whether differences in alienation and indifference are reflected equally across income classes is motivated by our broader interest
in understanding the political consequences of economic inequality. We argue that increasing economic inequality is likely accompanied by an increasing divergence in the economic needs and priorities of poorer and wealthier individuals, and that this divergence might well be reflected in increasingly distinctive policy preferences across income groups (Schlozman, Kay Lehman, Burns, Nancy & Verba, Sidney 1999).

In short, we are curious as to whether political candidates have been responsive to the divergent trends in the material well-being of citizens by adopting equally-appealing policy positions to these diverse constituencies. While we know that economic inequality in the United States has increased drastically over the time period of our analysis, what is critical to democratic politics in the U.S. is whether the poor and the rich are offered equally satisfying policy options as they consider competing candidates in presidential elections.

As we noted previously, our measures of alienation and indifference are similar to those used by Zipp (1985). Using American National Election Study data from 1968 to 1980, Zipp derives measures of alienation and indifference based on the individual’s self-reported position on seven-point scales on a variety of issues (e.g., urban unrest, Vietnam, government guarantee of jobs, minority rights, role of women and ideology) compared to the individual’s placement of where each candidate was located on the same set of seven-point scales. Zipp’s alienation measure is the absolute value of the minimum distance between the individual’s issue position and either of the candidate’s issue positions. Higher values thus represent greater alienation.

Zipp’s indifference measure is the absolute value of the difference of the distance between the respondent’s self-placement and the respondent’s perceived location of the Democratic candidate, and the distance between the respondent’s self-placement and the respondent’s perceived location of the Republican candidate, with this value being reversed in sign so that higher values represent greater indifference. That is, if individuals are equally
close to both candidates, regardless of the direction of the preferred policy differences, then they should be more indifferent to which candidate is selected; but if individuals are quite close to one candidate and very far away from the other, then they should have a strong preference as to who is elected, and thus have low levels of indifference.

Using data from the American National Election Study Cumulative File, we computed similar measures of alienation and indifference for each election year from 1972 to 2008. The measure of alienation we use is the minimum squared-distance from the respondent’s self-placement to the respondent’s placement of a presidential candidate. The measure of indifference we use is negative one times the absolute value of the difference between the squared-distances between the respondent’s self-placement, and his placement of each of the presidential candidates. Thus an indifference score of 0 means that a respondent is equidistant from both candidates, a negative indifference score of high magnitude suggests that the respondent is substantially closer to one candidate than the other. Our measures differ from those used by Zipp only in that we use quadratic, rather than linear, measures of utility. Our model is thus consistent with a standard spatial model with quadratic utility. We also computed three additional measures of alienation and indifference, reflecting differences in how the candidate’s policy position was computed (e.g., the individual’s perception vs. the mean placement of a candidate based on the entire sample’s reported perception) and differences in the voter’s utility function (i.e., quadratic versus linear; these results and the details on the different measurement decisions are presented in Appendix 5.1).

5.4 Multivariate Analysis: Alienation and Indifference

To test for the effects of alienation and indifference on voter turnout, we estimate an individual level multivariate model of turnout for each presidential election year from 1972 to 2008. We control for demographics, including a series of dummies for: the level of education
of the respondent; the position in the income distribution of the respondent; the age of the respondent, and the respondent’s gender, marital status and race. We also include a dummy for the South.

We include separate measures of alienation and indifference based on ideology, and measures of alienation and indifference based on the respondent’s responses to a question on the role of the government in guaranteeing jobs. These measures of alienation and indifference are computed and included in the multivariate model as they are the only seven-point issue scales that are available for the entire period. Although the respondents view of the role of government guaranteeing jobs is a more focused policy-oriented question, we expect that the alienation and indifference measures based on the respondent’s ideological positions are perhaps even more important as this general orientation toward the government’s role, as well as its correlation with partisanship, likely reflects individuals’ positions on the more specific economic policies salient during an election campaign.

We provide graphs of the first differences of the estimates for the four alienation and indifference variables in Figures 5.1 through 5.4. Each graph gives the marginal effect of a one standard deviation change in either alienation or indifference (on either ideology or government guaranteeing jobs), controlling for all other demographic variables in the model. The solid dot represents the estimated magnitude of the marginal effect, while the vertical line represents the 95% confidence interval for each estimated effect. Our expectation is that policy choices matter to citizens, and that the decision to vote is based on the choices available in each election. Hence, we expect to see estimates of these effects to be significantly different from zero.

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2Education was coded as less than high-school, high-school grad, some college, and college and beyond. Income was coded based on the income quintile the respondent was in. Age was coded as: 18-24, 25-30, 31-45, 46-60, 61-75, and 76-89.
Figure 5.1 graphs the effect of a one standard deviation change in indifference, measured on ideology, on turnout for each election from 1972 through 2008. The figure shows that respondents who are one standard deviation more indifferent between the candidates on ideology, ceteris paribus, are approximately 5 percentage points less likely to vote in each election from 1972 to 2008. We note that the estimated effect is quite stable and in nearly every election reaches traditional levels of statistical significance. Figure 5.2 graphs the effect of a one standard deviation change on the level of alienation, measured on ideology, on turnout for each election from 1972 through 2008. The figure shows that increased levels of alienation on ideology also lead to lower turnout, though the magnitude of the estimated effect is smaller than the estimated effect of indifference. Respondents who are one more standard deviation alienated are, ceteris paribus, about three percentage points less likely to vote.

[Figures 5.1 and 5.2 About Here]

Figure 5.3 graphs the effect of a one standard deviation change in indifference, measured this time on the respondents view of the role of government in guaranteeing jobs, on turnout. The effect of indifference based on government guaranteed jobs does not seem as large as the effects of indifference based on ideology, until the most recent elections. In 2004 and 2008 the estimated effect of indifference on government jobs on turnout was larger than the estimated effect of indifference on ideology on turnout. Figure 5.4 graphs the effect of a one standard deviation change in alienation on the respondents view of the role of government in guaranteeing jobs. The first differences associated with estimates of the effects of alienation on government job guarantees reported in Figure 5.4 are generally of

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3When estimating the same parameter for nine different elections, we are not overly concerned with traditional levels of statistical significance for each estimate. If the estimated coefficient is negative in each of the nine elections, even if we are only 70% confident that the true parameter is negative in each election, we are over 95% confident that the “average” parameter from which each individual election’s value is drawn is negative.
smaller magnitude than the effects of alienation on ideology. This latter finding on alienation on government job guarantees suggests that individuals’ alienation on this issue does not strongly influence their decisions to vote, but this finding of course also reflects that individuals’ positions on ideology and government job guarantees are inter-related.

[Figures 5.3 and 5.4 About Here]

Thus the basic findings confirm the theory that respondents perceptions of the difference between candidates does influence turnout. Respondents who perceive a greater difference between the candidates, and presumably have a stronger preference for one over the other, are more likely to vote. And the difference in the findings between indifference on ideology, and indifference on the government role in guaranteeing jobs is suggestive. The recent increase in the effect of indifference on the government’s role in guaranteeing jobs suggests that economic concerns could be becoming more important, and that respondents could be putting more emphasis on candidate’s positions on economic issues.

5.5 Class Differences in Indifference and Alienation

Our initial evidence, then, suggests that levels of indifference and alienation do affect voter turnout. The question remains as to whether indifference and alienation influence individuals’ vote choices differently depending on the individual’s level of income. We now look at both the levels of indifference and alienation expressed by respondents at different levels of income, and at the effects of alienation and indifference on respondents at different income levels.

Figure 5.5 graphs the level of indifference for respondents in each of the five income quintiles on ideology from 1972 through 2008. For the period 1972 through 2000 the levels of indifference reported by each quintile group basically move together. And the grap between
the groups is never very large, nor is the level of indifference generally monotonically related to income. However, in 2004 and 2008 we see a divergence between the groups. In both of those years the top quintile has a substantially lower level of indifference between the two candidates than does the bottom quintile. Note what this means: those in the top income quintile see a larger difference between the candidates on ideology than do those in the bottom quintile. Figure 5.6 graphs the level of indifference for respondents in each of the five income quintiles on the government’s role in guaranteeing jobs for 1972 through 2008. We see a similar phenomena here in 2008: respondents in the highest income quintile see a much larger difference between the candidates on this issue than do respondents in the lowest income group.

[Figures 5.5 and 5.6 Here]

We also examined the levels of alienation of respondents in each income group. Figure 5.7 gives the mean level of alienation on ideology for each quintile, and Figure 5.8 gives the mean level of alienation on guaranteed jobs for each quintile. Here we see that respondents in the poorest income quintile have become the most alienated respondents on government jobs and in ideology over time.

[Figures 5.7 and 5.8 Here]

One possibility that we considered in Chapter 1 is that the poor are, as a group, more alienated and more indifferent than the wealthy. Another possibility, however, is that the effects of alienation and indifference are greater for the poor than for the wealthy. That is, it is the poor for whom distinctive policy positions on redistribution have the greatest appeal as a benefit of voting. We test this possibility by estimating the multivariate model used above, disaggregated by income group. This allows the effects of alienation and indifference to vary by the income of the respondent.\footnote{We are thus allowing all the parameters in the model to vary over both income quintile, and year. We are generating 50 (10 years \* 5 income groups) distinct sets of estimates here.}
Figures 5.9 provides the first difference estimates for a one standard deviation change on level of indifference on ideology, for respondents in each of the five income quintiles, for each election from 1972 through 2008. First, we are simply not able to estimate the effect of indifference on ideology for each income group very precisely. Thus drawing inferences from comparisons across groups here is essentially not possible. Though we note that when averaging the estimates for any one group over time, they are not substantially different from one another.

[Figure 5.9 About Here]

Figure 5.10 provides similar first difference estimates for the effect of a one standard deviation change on the level of indifference on government’s role in guaranteeing jobs. Here occular analysis suggests that the role of government jobs has become larger for both the first, and especially the fifth, quintile in the last three elections. But once again we cannot estimate effects precisely enough to make meaningful comparisons of the effects across the quintile groups.

We also present estimates of the effect of alienation on ideology and alienation on guaranteed jobs by income quintile in Figure 5.11 and Figure 5.12. Again, our caveats about the precision of the estimates apply.

[Figure 5.11 and 5.12 Here]

5.6 Candidate Placement

We felt it would also be useful to examine one of the constituent components of the indifference and alienation measure: the placement of the candidates. Figures 5.13 and 5.14 graph the mean placement of the Democratic and Republican candidates for each election by each income quintile. What we see is substantial divergence over time between the placement by
the groups. Whereas from 1972 through 1980 the groups basically agreed on the placement of the Democratic and Republican candidates, they diverged quite sharply and systematically thereafter. Respondents in the lower income quintile consistently saw the Republican candidate as less conservative than did respondents in the upper income quintiles. And respondents in the lower income quintile consistently saw the Democratic candidate as more liberal than did respondents in the upper income quintiles.\footnote{We note that this is also consistent with respondents in the lower income quintile as seeing \textit{both} candidates as being more centrist, which could be observed if respondents in the lower income are simply guessing the midpoint more often than are respondents in higher income quintiles.}

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\begin{figure}[h]
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\end{figure}

\section{Conclusion}

First, we have shown very clearly that the choices offered voters affect their likelihood of voting. Respondents who perceive a substantial difference between the candidates are more likely to vote than are respondents who are indifferent between the candidates. However, this is somewhat tempered by our findings on alienation. Respondents who see neither candidate as representing their interests, are less likely to vote than respondents who find at least one candidate close to them.

Second, in examining how this might be related to representation in the United States we found that respondents in the bottom income quintile exhibited substantially higher levels of indifference than did respondents in the higher income quintiles in the last two presidential elections. This suggests that hopes that people at the bottom of the income distribution will be motivated to vote by a desire for economic redistribution are not likely to be met: as those persons are precisely the ones least likely to see the candidates as offering meaningful choices on issues.
And we have shown that there is substantial variation across the income distributions in the placement of the candidates. This could of course explain the failure of respondents from the bottom of the income distribution to perceive differences between the candidates. Respondents at the bottom of the income distribution do not see Republican candidates as being as conservative as other respondents do.
5.8 Appendix 5.2 Measuring Alienation and Indifference

When trying to measure alienation and indifference one is faced with (at least) one measurement choice, and (at least) one modeling choice. A respondent would be indifferent between two candidates if their utility for each candidate were equal. If we restrict ourselves to spatial (proximity) models of utility, this means that we need to place the respondent and the candidates on an issue scale, and come up with a functional form for utility.

Respondents place themselves on the issue scale, so the question becomes where to place the candidates. We have two choices: the respondent’s placement of each candidate, or some aggregated measure of placement such as the mean placement by all respondents of the candidate. The former can be problematic because: i) many respondents simply fail to place one or more candidates; and ii) the respondents may place their most preferred candidate closer to themselves (or vice-versa, place themselves closer to their most preferred candidate) than they would otherwise do in order to minimize cognitive dissonance. They might simply be rationalizing their voting decision. While the second problem could jeopardize the validity of estimates of the impact of issue positions on vote-choice, we argue that it should not affect estimates of the impact of issue positions on turnout. The decision to turnout is after all based on the voter’s perception of indifference between the candidates. However, we find it unlikely that the voter feels any need to justify the decision to turnout by rigging the placement of candidates to suggest a large preference for one candidate over the other. Thus even if the respondent is minimizing cognitive dissonance in vote-choice, this is what we would want to take into account in measuring their level of indifference between candidates.

When specifying the actual utility function for the voter, we consider two different Euclidean choices. First, we can specify utility as a quadratic loss function of the distance
between the voter and each candidate. This is the most commonly used function. And it has a very real substantive implication. It suggests that voters put a greater value on the difference in distances between candidates going from 3 to 4 than from 1 to 2. Or, we can use a linear loss function of the distance between the voter and each candidate.

Thus we have four possible combinations of measurement and model: two choices of candidate placement, and two choices of utility functions. To decide which is best, we opt for brute force empiricism: we estimate four sets of models of turnout. Whichever combination of measurement and model does the best at predicting turnout, we deem to be the ‘correct’ set.

One of our measures is thus what was used by Zipp (1985). Using American National Election Study data from 1968 to 1980, Zipp derives measures of alienation and indifference based on the individual’s self-reported position on seven-point scales on a variety of issues (e.g., urban unrest, Vietnam, government guarantee of jobs, minority rights, role of women and ideology) compared to the individual’s placement of where each candidate was located on the same set of seven-point scales. The alienation measure is the absolute value of the minimum distance between the individual’s issue position and either of the candidate’s issue positions. Higher values thus represent greater alienation.

The indifference measure Zipp used is the absolute value of the difference of the distance between the respondent’s self-placement and the perceived location of the Democratic candidate, and the distance between the respondent’s self-placement and the perceived location of the Republican candidate, with this value being reversed in sign so that higher values represent greater indifference. That is, if individuals are equally close to both candidates, regardless of the direction of the preferred policy differences, then they should be more indifferent to which candidate is selected; but if individuals are quite close to one candidate
and very far away from the other, then they should have a strong preference as to who is elected, and thus have low levels of indifference.

We computed the same measures of alienation and indifference used by Zipp for each election year from 1972 to 2008. As described above, we also computed three additional measures of alienation and indifference, reflecting differences in how the candidate’s policy position was computed (e.g., the individual’s perception vs. the mean placement of a candidate based on the entire sample’s reported perception) and differences in the voter’s utility function (i.e., quadratic versus linear).

Table 5.1 gives Log-Likelihood values and measures of fit (ePCP) for a model of turnout estimated on each presidential election from 1972 to 2004. The model includes basic demographic variables for each respondent: education, income, and age, as well as a dummy variable for the South. Education is included as a series of dummy variables (high-school graduates, some college, and college and beyond – with no high school degree being the omitted category). Income is also measured by a series of dummies for which income quintile the respondent is in, with the bottom quintile being the omitted category. Age is also measured as a series of dummies, with the oldest group being the omitted category. Gender, marital status, and race are included. Finally, there is a dummy variable for the South.

[Table 5.1 Here]

Looking across the rows, one can see almost no difference in fit in any year between the models. Clearly whether one chooses to use the respondent placement of the candidate (Abs-Resp and Squared-Resp columns) versus the mean placement of the candidate (Abs-Mean and Squared-Mean columns) makes no difference. The log likelihood values and ePCP values barely change. Similarly, comparing the models using squared distance versus linear

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6See Herron (1999) for a discussion of ePCP.
(absolute value) distance, there is again virtually no difference in model fit. We do note that in only one year do the models based on mean placement of the candidate, rather than respondent placement of the candidate, fare better. Thus consistent with our theoretical view, the model using respondent placement appears to be preferred. However, this model has a severe practical shortcoming as many voters cannot place the candidate on the issues. Examining how to treat respondents who cannot place one or both of the candidates remains an ongoing research question.
Figure 5.1: Marginal Effects of Indifference on Ideology Over Time
Figure 5.2: Marginal Effects of Alienation on Ideology Over Time
Figure 5.3: Marginal Effects of Indifference on Govt-Jobs Over Time

Marginal Effect of 1 Std Dev Change in Indifference−on−Govt−Jobs on Turnout

First Differences

-0.20 -0.10 0.00 0.10

Years

Figure 5.4: Marginal Effects of Alienation on Govt-Jobs Over Time

Marginal Effect of 1 Std Dev Change in Alienation–on–Govt–Jobs on Turnout

First Differences

Years


−0.20 −0.10 0.00 0.10
Figure 5.5: Level of Indifference on Ideology - By Income Quintile
Figure 5.6: Level of Indifference on Govt-Jobs - By Income Quintile
Figure 5.7: Level of Alienation on Ideology - By Income Quintile

Alienation on Ideology by Income Quintile

Year of Study

- Bottom Quintile
- 2nd Quintile
- 3rd Quintile
- 4th Quintile
- Top Quintile
Figure 5.8: Level of Alienation on Government Jobs - By Income Quintile
Figure 5.9: Marginal Effects of Indifference on Ideology By Income

Marginal Effect of 1 Std Dev Change in Indifference–on–Ideology on Turnout (Quintile 1)

Marginal Effect of 1 Std Dev Change in Indifference–on–Ideology on Turnout (Quintile 2)

Marginal Effect of 1 Std Dev Change in Indifference–on–Ideology On Turnout (Quintile 3)

Marginal Effect of 1 Std Dev Change in Indifference–on–Ideology on Turnout (Quintile 4)

Marginal Effect of 1 Std Dev Change in Indifference–on–Ideology on Turnout (Quintile 5)
Figure 5.10: Marginal Effects of Indifference on Govt Jobs By Income

Marginal Effect of 1 Std Dev Change in Indifference−on−Govt−Jobs on Turnout (Quintile 1)

Marginal Effect of 1 Std Dev Change in Indifference−on−Govt−Jobs on Turnout (Quintile 2)

Marginal Effect of 1 Std Dev Change in Indifference−on−Govt−Jobs on Turnout (Quintile 3)

Marginal Effect of 1 Std Dev Change in Indifference−on−Govt−Jobs on Turnout (Quintile 4)

Marginal Effect of 1 Std Dev Change in Indifference−on−Govt−Jobs on Turnout (Quintile 5)
Figure 5.11: Marginal Effects of Alienation on Ideology By Income
Figure 5.12: Marginal Effects of Alienation on Govt Jobs By Income

Marginal Effect of 1 Std Dev Change in Alienation–on–Govt–Jobs on Turnout (Quintile 1)

Marginal Effect of 1 Std Dev Change in Alienation–on–Govt–Jobs on Turnout (Quintile 2)

Marginal Effect of 1 Std Dev Change in Alienation–on–Govt–Jobs on Turnout (Quintile 3)

Marginal Effect of 1 Std Dev Change in Alienation–on–Govt–Jobs on Turnout (Quintile 4)

Marginal Effect of 1 Std Dev Change in Alienation–on–Govt–Jobs on Turnout (Quintile 5)
Figure 5.13: Placement of Democratic Candidates by Income Quintile

Democratic Candidate Placement on Ideology by Income Quintile

- Bottom Quintile
- 2nd Quintile
- 3rd Quintile
- 4th Quintile
- Top Quintile

Year of Study
Figure 5.14: Placement of Republican Candidates by Income Quintile
Table 5.1: APPENDIX - Fit of Alternative Model Specifications and Measures  
Dependent Variable: Reported Turnout

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</tbody>
</table>

Goodness of fit measures are reported for four models: 1) Abs-Resp: Absolute values of distances, and respondent placement of candidates; 2) Abs-Mean: Absolute values of distances, and mean placement of candidates; 3) Squared-Resp: Squared values of distances, and respondent placement of candidates; 4) Squared-Mean: Squared values of distances, and respondent placements of candidates.

Each Model includes demographic characteristics of respondents, and alienation and indifference for two issues: ideology and government-guaranteed jobs.

Data are from the National Election Studies.
References


*http://www.jstor.org/stable/3449920


*http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2010.00462.x*


